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INTRODUCTION—WHY ISN’T PORN “PROSTITUTION?” CAN YOU ONLY FILM 
PORN IN CALIFORNIA AND NEW HAMPSHIRE? 
Lawyers cringe when they hear, “You’re a lawyer? I bet you didn’t know 
. . .” or, “I heard that . . . .” Often, these introductions are followed by some le-
gal analysis that the half-drunken-idiot friend of your wife’s college-
roommate’s cousin got from his friend who saw it on “The Internet.” In fact, 
millions of people a year mistake a sentence they read in the comments section 
of a random website for solid legal advice. 
For example, any lawyer who practices copyright law has been “informed” 
that if you mail a work to yourself, the postmark on the unopened letter substi-
tutes for a federal copyright registration.1 Similarly, criminal lawyers would all
love to smack the next imbecile upside the head who “informs” them that an 
undercover police officer has to reveal his status if asked.2 The author himself
nearly had to be hospitalized because he tried rolling his eyes to a degree of 
medical impossibility after having “fair use” explained to him by someone who 
read a thread about it on Reddit3 which, apparently in some circles, substitutes
for three years of law school and a bar exam. 
1  The question about the “poor man’s copyright” is common: “Can’t I just put it in an enve-
lope and mail it to myself?” Though this may provide some evidence in a copyright suit over 
who created a work and when, it is not definitive. See William Bee Ravenel Lewis, The Next 
Big Hit: Protecting and Exploiting (In a Good Way) Your Musician-Client’s Intellectual 
Property, S.C. LAW., July 2014, at 47, 48. Under U.S. law, a copyright does not have to be 
registered; it is automatic when a work is “fixed in any tangible medium.” 17 U.S.C. § 102 
(2012). Understandably the poor man’s copyright is not reliable since an envelope can be 
mailed unsealed, or steamed, or frozen open and resealed. Plus, one can register a copyright 
for as low as $35 so, for many, actually registering a copyright is a poor man’s copyright. 
See Fees, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html [https://perma.c 
c/V3PE-G7CF] (last visited Sept. 22, 2016). 
2  This myth likely comes from a misconception about entrapment. Entrapment occurs where 
a government official induces someone to commit a crime he would not have otherwise 
committed. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-206 (2010). There are no laws that prevent 
police officers from lying about their occupation, even and especially when working under-
cover. Officers are even specifically immune from certain crimes when dealing drugs in an 
official capacity. 21 U.S.C. § 885(d) (2012). 
3  Reddit is a widely popular and well-known Internet forum concerning a tremendous host 
of subjects. See Nancy Leong & Joanne Morando, Communication in Cyberspace, 94 N.C. 
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But, of all the legal tropes that lawyers hear shouted over the din of a 
somewhat crowded bar smelling of last night’s spilled beer and roach spray, 
nothing annoys this author more than the oft-repeated, but never true, “it is le-
gal to film porn only in California and New Hampshire.” This is, at best, an un-
educated fool repeating a myth. At worst, it is a lie—and a convenient one that 
politicians, journalists, and assorted fools continue to repeat.4 Therefore, this
article is primarily aimed at the curious, but it is also intended to educate the 
misinformed and to embarrass those who knowingly misrepresent the state of 
the law. 
But, if I am going to be that bold, I had better be able to answer some ques-
tions. For example, why isn’t commercial porn production actually “filmed 
prostitution?” A simplistic view of the commercial pornography industry might 
suggest an easy, and contrary, answer.  
A: Prostitution is paying for sex.  
B: Commercial pornography actors take money to have sex.  
A+B = commercial porn actors are prostitutes, and commercial porn direc-
tors are pimps. 
L. REV. 105, 146 (2015) (“Reddit is a website that bills itself as ‘the front page of the Inter-
net.’ It is divided into a large number of forums, all of which are publicly accessible and in
any of which anyone can write a post of any length. The site constantly updates itself, mak-
ing certain content more or less visible depending on the number of views the content has
received and the time since the posting. All posts are publicly available until the post is re-
moved by their creators.”); see also Ian Herbert, Where We Are with Location Tracking: A
Look at the Current Technology and the Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence,
16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 442, 461 n.97 (2011) (“Reddit is a website where users post con-
tent, such as links to articles or videos, and other users rate the quality of the post and post
comments. The posting, comments and voting are done through anonymous usernames.”). It
is well established that Reddit is not a reliable source for legal advice. See, e.g., Caley Clin-
ton, Pro Tip: Don’t Ask Reddit for Legal Advice, WIS. L.J. (Aug. 11, 2014, 3:20 PM),
http://wislawjournal.com/2014/08/11/pro-tip-dont-ask-reddit-for-legal-advice [https://perm
a.cc/Q53E-FT3L] (comparing legal advice on Reddit to “ask[ing] the first five people you
see on the street”); Samer Kalaf, This Is What Happens When You Ask Reddit for Legal Ad-
vice, DEADSPIN: THE CONCOURSE (Aug. 11, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://theconcourse.dead
spin.com/this-is-what-happens-when-you-ask-reddit-for-legal-advi-1619404235 [https://per
ma.cc/H6RN-96J9] (noting culture of unreliability and citing example of legal complications
arising from Reddit user’s reliance on advice parroting television plot).
4  See, e.g., Jonathan Gonzalez & John Cádiz Klemack, Porn Industry May Leave LA After 
New Condom Law, NBCLOSANGELES.COM (Mar. 9, 2012, 6:04 PM), http://www.nbclosan 
geles.com/news/local/New-Condom-Law-Has-Porn-Industry-Thinking-of-New-Locations-
142147623.html [https://perma.cc/GXK5-22V6] (quoting municipal government official 
claiming it is illegal to film pornography in Arizona); Melanie Mason, California Assembly 
Passes Bill to Require Condom Use in Adult Films, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-condoms-adult-films-20140527-stor y.html 
[https://perma.cc/MS3L-L9KS] (noting that California State Assemblyman Isadore Hall III 
“said California and New Hampshire are the only two states that allow adult film production 
. . . .”). 
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The California Supreme Court, though, explicitly held that porn is not 
prostitution.5 Likewise, a more recent New Hampshire case says the same.6 The
uninformed then conclude that the other forty eight states, the District of Co-
lumbia, Guam, The Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and The 
Northern Marianas Islands are all unified in their resolve that a commercial 
film production is prostitution. 
Given how simple it is, this reasoning has some appeal. But simplicity and 
the law seldom go well together. The real question is a two-parter. First, we 
must ask whether commercial pornography fits the definition of “prostitution” 
under state law. If it does, we must then ask whether the state’s free speech 
clause, or the First Amendment would tolerate prosecution of a commercial 
pornographer under that law. 
This article will clarify both questions. First, is porn actually “prostitu-
tion?” Second, can you film porn outside of California and New Hampshire? 
One analysis answers both questions—pornography does not fit the definition 
of prostitution and, even if it did, it could not be constitutionally prohibited as 
such. One sees how this error could be made, but only by the least-informed, 
and those who have some motivation to misstate the law. So, let’s get started 
with a little bit of recent history, and then get to the analysis. 
I. THE PORN INDUSTRY FALLS OUT OF LOVE WITH SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
This issue of where porn can legally be filmed is currently a much debated
question, given the well-publicized “condom wars” in California. Southern Cal-
ifornia, particularly the San Fernando Valley, is popularly known as the epicen-
ter of the adult film production industry.7 Southern California once provided a
socially liberal attitude, a critical mass of talent, and a California Supreme 
Court case explicitly protecting the industry.8 With these resources in place,
porn and Southern California enjoyed a long, happy, and prosperous marriage. 
In 2012, the relationship soured. First, Los Angeles County passed new 
regulations on porn production.9 As the industry began to eye short distance
moves to other counties,10 a similar statewide bill gained traction in the Cali-
5  People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128 (Cal. 1988). 
6  State v. Theriault, 960 A.2d 687 (N.H. 2008). 
7  See, e.g., Clay Calvert & Robert Richards, Law & Economics of the Adult Entertainment 
Industry Today: An Inside View from the Industry’s Leading Trade Publisher, 4 U. DENV.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 2, 2 (2008); Sue Chan, San Fernando’s Open Secret, CBS NEWS (Nov. 
25, 2002, 3:27 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/san-fernandos-open-secret [https://perm 
a.cc/2KJ2-9952].
8  Freeman, 758 P.2d at 1128. 
9 L.A., CAL., CODE tit. 11, div. 1, ch. 11.39 (2012).
10 See, e.g., Porn Producers Consider Moving Operations from Valley to Camarillo, CBS
L.A. (Mar. 28, 2013, 11:57 PM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2013/03/28/porn-producers-
consider-moving-operations-from-valley-to-camarillo [https://perma.cc/6RSS-3WHK].
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fornia state legislature. Between these regulations and a less than business-
friendly environment in California, many adult film companies in the state be-
gan calling the moving vans.11
When they did, debate raged as to whether they could leave at all. Some 
asked whether the porn industry was stuck in a toxic relationship with Califor-
nia, with its only other refuge in the far northeast. Others asked the perennial 
question: “Why isn’t porn considered prostitution?” This article will resolve 
both questions. 
A. The Breakup Begins—Measure B
In January 2012, Los Angeles County passed “Measure B,” mandating the 
use of condoms in adult-film productions.12 While some might consider such a
move to be “common sense,” adult film professionals told another story. Pro-
ducers said that condoms hurt sales.13 Simplistic thinking would suggest that
porn actresses would welcome the measure, but in reality, most were against 
it.14
11  Richard Verrier, Porn Production Plummets in Los Angeles, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014, 
5:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-onlocation-la-
porn-industry-20140806-story.html [https://perma.cc/A8XB-FZN6]; Elex Michaelson, LA’s 
‘Runaway Porn’ Problem Mounting, ABC7 (Aug. 5, 2014), http://abc7.com/news/las-
runaway-porn-problem-mounting/243823 [https://perma.cc/X5J7-W4WJ]; Marc J. Randaz-
za, Randazza Legal Group: The Case for Relocating Porn Production to Las Vegas, XBIZ 
(Aug. 6, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.xbiz.com/news/152228 [https://perma.cc/BF6L-
NN69]; Hunter Stuart, Los Angeles Sees Sharp Falloff in Porn Production Permit Requests, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2013, 6:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/15/ 
porn-los-angeles-permit-requests_n_3086479.html [https://perma.cc/PLU3-5QXM]; Law-
rence G. Walters, The Sunshine State: A Ray of Hope for Adult Content Producers, 
WOODHULL FREEDOM FOUND. (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.woodhullfoundation.org/2012/ 
sex-and-the-law/the-sunshine-state-a-ray-of-hope-for-adult-content-producers/#_ftn19 
[https://perma.cc/DW32-V9X3].  
12 L.A., CAL., CODE tit. 11, div. 1, ch. 11.39.110 (2012).
13 Eyder Peralta, Los Angeles Approves Condom Requirement in Porn Shoots, NPR: THE
TWO WAY (Jan. 17, 2012, 10:39 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2012/01/17/145345888/los-angeles-set-to-approve-condom-requirement-in-porn-shoots 
[https://perma.cc/EC6P-FUQD]. 
14  The author’s experience as an attorney in the adult entertainment industry informs this 
view; see also Richard Abowitz, The Porn World Says No to Condoms, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 
20, 2012, 10:39 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/01/20/the-porn-world-
says-no-to-condoms.html [https://perma.cc/37DJ-K3BR]. Actress Kayden Kross, said:  
We have the choice already to use condoms and most don’t. The reason why is that it is painful. 
Normal sex lasts about 15 minutes and it is slower and it is done in more natural positions. We 
do sex for 45 plus minutes, faster, and in more hardcore positions while opening up for the cam-
era. That kind of friction with a condom is very painful. As a performer, I used a condom twice 
and never again. 
Id.; see also Jason Shachner, Unwrapped: How the Los Angeles County Safer Sex in the 
Adult Film Industry Act’s Condom Mandate Hurts Performers & Violates the First Amend-
ment, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 345, 346 (2014); Chauntelle Anne Tibbals “[A]nything That 
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The measure went further than just requiring condoms, though. Measure B 
required adult film producers to obtain a permit before shooting “any film, vid-
eo, multimedia or other representation of sexual intercourse.”15 It further al-
lowed Los Angeles County to conduct warrantless searches and to revoke per-
mits with largely unbridled discretion.16 These provisions were deemed
unconstitutional and were enjoined by the Central District of California.17 De-
spite that ruling, the regulation requiring the mandatory use of condoms on set 
remained intact over a challenge by the adult film industry.18
B. AB 1576
Assembly Bill 1576 was a proposed California state law based on the Los 
Angeles condom ordinance. When it came to the California State Assembly, 
opponents claimed that the multi-billion dollar industry would leave Califor-
nia.19 Regulation proponents, however, argued that the industry could not leave
because it was the only state in the Union, aside from New Hampshire, where 
porn production is legal.20 Those supporters believed the porn industry was
trapped in California, and thus, the state’s legislature and regulators could treat 
the industry any way they liked, with no fear of porn’s jobs and billions of dol-
lars in revenue going elsewhere.21 
Forces Itself into My Vagina Is by Definition Raping Me . . .”—Adult Film Performers and 
Occupational Safety and Health, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 232 (2012). 
15 L.A., CAL., CODE tit. 11, div. 1, ch. 11.39.010 (2012).
16 Id. chs. 11.39.110, 11.39.130; Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566, 571 (9th Cir.
2014). 
17  Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F.Supp.2d 1113, 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
18  Id., aff’d, 774 F.3d 566 (9th. Cir. 2014). For a discussion of the constitutional implications 
of the remaining portion of the ordinance, see Elizabeth Sbardellati, Skin Flicks Without the 
Skin: Why Government Mandated Condom Use in Adult Films Is a Violation of the First 
Amendment, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 138 (2013); Shachner, supra note 14. In fact, even 
HIV/AIDS prevention organizations opposed the ordinance for violating standing health 
codes and personal privacy. Eric Paul Leue, Prominent HIV/AIDS Organizations Oppose 
California’s A.B. 1576, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12, 2014, 7:41 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-paul-leue/prominent-hivaids-organiz_b_5663504.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZRX6-VJDM]. 
19  Hearing on A. B. 1576 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Arts, Entm’t, Sports, Tourism, & 
Internet Media, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. 7 (Cal. 2014), 
http://aart.assembly.ca.gov/sites/aart.assembly.ca.gov/files/AB%201576%20analysis.pdf [htt 
ps://perma.cc/CS2H-V8GB]. 
20  AHF: Top Porn Lawyer Says Industry Can’t Move from CA, BUS. WIRE (Sep. 24, 2012, 
9:30 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120924005561/en/AHF-Top-Porn-
Lawyer-Industry-Move-CA [https://perma.cc/97HR-7PJ2]; The Problem with Producing 
Porn Outside California .  .  ., ADULT BIZ LAW (Sep. 21, 2012), http://adultbizlaw.com/the-
problem-with-producing-porn-outside-california [https://perma.cc/W2A3-HDRB]; see also, 
Hearing on A. B. 1576, supra note 19; Mason, supra note 4. 
21  Mason, supra note 4. 
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While AB 1576 failed, the debate over it gave new life to the myth that 
California and New Hampshire were the only places in the United States where 
it is legal to make adult films. Journalists thought they were the first to discover 
this hidden legal gem. For example, Dennis Romero writing in the L.A. Weekly 
falsely declared: “Porn is only explicitly legal in California and New Hamp-
shire. Otherwise it’s prostitution.”22 And, with that, he damaged his own credi-
bility and made all of his readers that much less educated. To understand how, 
we must go back to the beginning—to the seminal California Supreme Court 
case, People v. Freeman. 
II. CALIFORNIA: PEOPLE V. FREEMAN
In the 1988 case People v. Freeman, the California Supreme Court ruled 
that when an adult film company pays actors to appear in a film, it is not prosti-
tution.23 In that case, Harold Freeman, a professional porn producer and direc-
tor, hired and paid actors to perform in a non-obscene erotic film called Caught 
from Behind, Part II.24 It did not win an Oscar that year.
A. Freeman’s Historical Context
To understand that case and what comes after, it is important to delve at 
least a little bit into the “culture wars” that brought it about. In 1969, President 
Johnson formed the President’s Commission on Obscenity and Pornography to 
study the negative effects of pornography on the public.25 Much to the dismay
of social conservatives,26 the Commission found no such negative effects. In
fact, they found precisely the opposite: “In sum, empirical research designed to 
clarify the question has found no evidence to date that exposure to explicit sex-
ual materials plays a significant role in the causation of delinquent or criminal 
behavior among youth or adults. The Commission cannot conclude that expo-
sure to erotic materials is a factor in the causation of sex crime or sex delin-
quency.”27
22  Dennis Romero, Porn Industry Appears to Admit It’s Breaking the Law, LA WEEKLY 
(Sept. 22, 2015, 8:04 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/porn-industry-appears-to-admit-
its-breaking-the-law-6073152 [https://perma.cc/B2NN-477W]. 
23  People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128 (Cal. 1988). 
24  Id. at 1129. 
25  CONG. COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT], https://bab 
el.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951p00073248m;view=1up;seq=1 [https://perma.cc/FA4 
F-S65W].
26  Richard M. Nixon, Statement about the Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Por-
nography, 381 PUB. PAPERS 940–41 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
27  COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 27 (footnote omitted). 
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The Commission found that pornography was far from troubling, and even 
recommended repealing laws restricting pornography distribution to adults. The 
Commission wrote: “The Commission believes that there is no warrant for con-
tinued governmental interference with the full freedom of adults to read, obtain 
or view whatever such material they wish.”28
A landmark adult entertainment case shortly thereafter noted the findings: 
“On the positive side, explicit sexual materials are sought as a source of enter-
tainment and information by substantial numbers of American adults. At times, 
these materials also appear to serve to increase and facilitate constructive 
communication about sexual matters within marriage.”29
In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan shepherded a new wave of social conserva-
tism.30 The 1980s saw a number of attempts to curb pornography, specifically
in California.31 Reagan commissioned his Attorney General, Ed Meese, to
come up with a new study to contradict the prior Commission’s report.32 Riding
this wave, a California prosecutor tried to put an end to “that kind of thing” in 
California by charging Harold Freeman with pandering—defined as 
“procur[ing] another person for the purpose of prostitution.”33 However, Free-
man was not your garden-variety pimp; he was producing an adult film.34
B. Freeman at the California Court of Appeals
Freeman filmed Caught From Behind, Part II, in a private residence that 
was closed to the public.35 He paid the featured actors, as well as the modeling
28  Id. at 52. 
29  Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 108 n.26 (1973). 
30  See, e.g., GLEAVES WHITNEY, RONALD REAGAN AND THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 
(2004), 
http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1093&context=ask_gleaves 
[https://perma.cc/83WB-FL3F]; Gil Troy, The Age of Reagan, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. AM.
HIST., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/essays/age-reagan [https://perma.cc/EY 
36-MA2D] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
31  Dennis Anderson, Pornography Industry Poses Problems in California, LAWRENCE
DAILY J.-WORLD, Jun. 1, 1986, at 7D, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=21 
99&dat=19860601&id=g0wyAAAAIBAJ&sjid=cuUFAAAAIBAJ&pg=6802,191955&hl=e
n [http://perma.cc/MDE6-KB8C]; California Attacking Pornography, SUMTER DAILY ITEM, 
Aug. 6, 1985, at 8A, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1979&dat=19850805&id= 
1pAiAAAAIBAJ&sjid=5q0FAAAAIBAJ&pg=5751,5691979&hl=en [https://perma.cc/553 
R-5TB5].
32  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL
REPORT (1986), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015073491824;view=1up;seq= 
1 [https://perma.cc/GV74-MT3C]. 
33  CAL. PENAL CODE § 266i (West 2014). 
34  See generally IDIOCRACY (Twentieth Century Fox 2006) (“You see, a pimp’s love is very 
different from that of a square.”). 
35  People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Cal. 1988). 
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agency that provided some of them.36 Freeman was then charged with five
counts of pandering under California’s Pimping Statute, Penal Code section 
266i, based on his conduct of hiring the five actresses in the film.37 A jury
found him guilty, and he was sentenced to ninety days in jail, five years’ proba-
tion, and a $10,000 restitution payment.38
Freeman appealed and received a cursory affirmation of his sentence from 
the California Court of Appeals, rejecting all of Freeman’s arguments, with nei-
ther citation nor analysis. Freeman argued that the prostitution statute did not fit 
his conduct because there was no “sexual gratification” inherent in the sexually 
explicit performances. The appellate court rejected that argument stating:  
The actors and actresses herein involved were employed to engage in acts or 
prostitution, which is defined in numerous California cases as the engaging in 
sexual acts for money. The people herein engaged agreed to and did engage in 
sexual conduct and testified that they “acted” before the cameras in the produc-
tion of the motion picture herein in question “for the money they received.” The 
guilt of the defendant of the crime charged and of which he was convicted is 
clear.39
Freeman also argued that he had a First Amendment right to produce adult 
films, and that his conviction violated that right. The California Appellate 
Court gave even shorter treatment to this argument:  
Much of appellant’s opening brief is devoted to a discussion of the application 
of the First Amendment. That discussion is out of place in this appeal. It is well 
settled that the distribution of a movie or book is protected by the First Amend-
ment. However, a criminal act is not protected under the First Amendment mere-
ly because it occurs within the context of a motion picture production.40
While the majority opinion was a mere 250 words, there was a lengthy, and 
prescient dissent by Judge Deborah Wilson McClosky.41 In her dissent, Judge
McClosky discussed the fact that merely adding the First Amendment to un-
lawful conduct, by filming it, would not immunize a defendant from liability.42
Even so, she relied heavily upon the weighty pronouncement by the California 
Supreme Court in Barrows v. Municipal Court, to pronounce her view that the 
creation of expressive materials required a different analysis. 
The Barrows court went on to explain: 
Our holding here does not suggest that acts which are independently prohibited 
by law may be consummated without sanction on the stage merely because they 
occur during the course of a theatrical play. Dramatic license would not supply 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 1129–30. 
39  People v. Freeman, 233 Cal. Rptr. 510, 511 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), rev’d, 758 P.2d 
1128 (Cal. 1988). 
40  Id. at 510–11. 
41  Id. at 512. 
42  Id.
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indulgence for the actual murder of the villain, the rape of the heroine, or the 
maiming of the hero. Neither do we intend to imply, however, that conduct or 
speech in a theatrical production is to be judged by the same standards as con-
duct or speech occurring on the street or other public place. Giannini makes it 
clear that “acts which are unlawful in a different context, circumstance, or place, 
may be depicted or incorporated in a stage or screen presentation and come 
within the protection of the First Amendment, losing that protection only if 
found to be obscene.” We particularly reaffirm this portion of the decision in 
Giannini, for any more restrictive rule could annihilate in a stroke much of the 
modern theater and cinema. The loss to culture and to First Amendment rights 
would be equally tragic.43
Judge McClosky admitted that Caught from Behind, Part II may be of little 
“value to our culture,” but she was not so arrogant as to suggest that a value 
analysis was necessary or proper. 
I cannot conclude that the purpose of the Legislature in enacting Penal Code sec-
tion 266i was to prevent the production or distribution of theatrical plays or mo-
tion pictures depicting sex acts between consenting adults. Had it wished to do 
so the Legislature could have added the production of such plays or films to the 
list of proscribed acts and conduct listed in that section. It did not do so. It is not 
our right to interpret a criminal statute broadly to aid a finding of guilt, especial-
ly where to do so invades a First Amendment protection. It is plain to me that 
the defendant’s purpose here was to profit from making a motion picture and not 
“to procure a person, or attempt to procure a person, for the purpose of prostitu-
tion” within the meaning of Penal Code section 266i.44
In what seems to be a sarcastic retort to the majority’s remark that Free-
man’s guilt was “obvious,” Judge McClosky concluded her dissent with a bit of 
attitude. “It is obvious that the strictures of the First Amendment may be just as 
effectively violated by penalizing production as by penalizing distribution or 
viewing.”45
C. Freeman at the California Supreme Court
While Judge McClosky was alone in her dissent at the Court of Appeals, 
her rationale was both compelling and inspiring—at least inspiring enough to 
convince Freeman that his cause was worth fighting for. Freeman appealed to 
the California Supreme Court, which roundly rejected the 250 word affirma-
tion. The Supreme Court seemed persuaded by Judge McClosky’s dissent and 
held that Freeman was a free man, both because his conduct did not fit the pros-
titution statute, and that even if it did, the First Amendment would not tolerate 
such a conviction.46
43  Id. (McClosky, J., dissenting) (quoting Barrows v. L.A. Mun. Ct., 464 P.2d 483, 488–90 
(Cal. 1970) (citations omitted)). 
44  Id. 
45  Id. at 513–14. 
46  People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1131–35 (Cal. 1988). 
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1. Freeman—Statutory Construction: “Sexual Gratification”
The California Supreme Court first tackled the issue of whether Freeman’s 
conduct met the statutory definition of “prostitution.” “In order to constitute 
prostitution, the money or other consideration must be paid for the purpose of 
sexual arousal or gratification.”47 This is the heart of the matter—the purpose
or intent. Who is gratifying whom, and more importantly, why? 
Under California Law, the elements of “prostitution” include a payment 
and a sexual act.48 Looking at it simplistically, a porn shoot seems to qualify.
After all, someone is having sex and getting paid for it. Freeman argued, in 
part, that since there was no “customer,” there was no prostitution.49 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court brushed that aside in favor of an even simpler intent 
analysis: “Whether or not prostitution must always involve a ‘customer,’ it is 
clear that in order to constitute prostitution, the money or other consideration 
must be paid for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.”50
The Freeman court made a distinction between paying to obtain personal 
pleasure, and paying to obtain acting services.51 Under the California Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the California prostitution statute, the payment must 
be “for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.”52 Since the payment was
for acting fees, and not to incentivize sexual gratification, it was not prostitu-
tion.53
2. Judge McClosky’s Revenge—First Amendment Protection for Porn
The Freeman court could have stopped there. Mr. Freeman’s conduct did 
not fit the statute, and he lacked “the requisite mens rea or purpose to establish 
procurement for purposes of prostitution.”54 The end, right? Not quite.
 The California Supreme Court seemed to be moved by Judge McClosky’s 
dictum that the California legislature could have added the production of sex-
ually explicit plays or films to the prostitution statute, if it wished to.55 The
Court pre-emptively knocked out that choice by holding that even if the legisla-
ture made such a choice, it would be unconstitutional.56
47  Id. at 1131 (emphasis omitted). 
48  Id. at 1130. 
49  Id. at 1130–31. 
50  Id. at 1131 (emphasis omitted). 
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  People v. Freeman, 233 Cal. Rptr. 510, 512 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (McClosky, J., dis-
senting) (“Had it wished to do so the Legislature could have added the production of such 
plays or films to the list of proscribed acts and conduct listed in that section.”). 
56  Freeman, 758 P.2d at 1131. 
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Voltaire, the French Enlightenment philosopher, is credited with saying, “I 
disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say 
it.”57 The California Supreme Court presented that very attitude, a little less el-
egantly, but in the words necessary to give adult film production the cover of 
First Amendment protection. “Regardless of our view of the social utility of 
this particular motion picture, our analysis must begin with the premise that a 
nonobscene motion picture is protected by the guarantee of free expression 
found in the First Amendment.”58
The California Supreme Court held that even if it deemed payment for por-
nographic acting services to be “prostitution,” the First Amendment would not 
tolerate a prostitution charge under those circumstances.59 To hold otherwise
would mean that an entire genre of film would be per se unlawful.60 Specifical-
ly, the Court stated “the application of the pandering statute to the hiring of ac-
tors to perform in the production of a nonobscene motion picture would im-
pinge unconstitutionally upon First Amendment values.”61 In fact, if the statute
were so interpreted, it would sweep up a vast swath of expression, leaving us 
with no more commercially produced pornography. 
The California Supreme Court determined that the purpose of the prostitu-
tion statute was to address a state interest in combatting prostitution, which did 
not apply in this case.62 The payment was “for the right to photograph the per-
formance” and not to induce a crime separate from the filming.63 Moreover, the
Court held that a strict reading of a prostitution statutory definition “could an-
nihilate in a stroke much of the modern theater and cinema.”64 This was a pre-
emptive shot across the legislature’s bow—warning them that even if they 
chose to amend the statute to remove the gratification requirement, it would not 
be open season on adult film producers.65
The Freeman court thus gave us the alternative rationale. The First 
Amendment bars any prostitution charge in this setting, whether the language 
of the prostitution statute fits the conduct or not. From the outset of the opinion 
the Court remarked:  
57  See Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655, 661 (D.N.J. 1975). “Although this quote is 
commonly attributed to Voltaire, it is actually a paraphrase of his attitude by S. G. Tallentyre 
in Friends of Voltaire 199 (London 1907).” Id. at 661 n.3; see also Young v. Am. Mini The-
atres, 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.19 (1976) (citing Tallentyre and noting that the statement is “[a] re-
mark attributed to Voltaire” and not crediting it as an actual quote). 
58  Freeman, 758 P.2d at 1131. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. at 1132. 
61  Id. at 1131 (emphasis added). 
62  Id. at 1132. 
63  Id. at 1134. 
64  Id. at 1132 (quoting Barrows v. L.A. Mun. Ct., 464 P.2d 483, 488–90 (Cal. 1970)). 
65  Id. 
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The film was not determined to be obscene and for purposes of this review must 
be deemed to be not obscene. Thus the prosecution of defendant under the pan-
dering statute must be viewed as a somewhat transparent attempt at an “end run” 
around the First Amendment and the state obscenity laws. Landmark decisions 
of this court and the United States Court compel us to reject such an effort.66
In an effort to save the prosecution, the state argued that there might be 
compelling governmental interests at play. The state argued that interpreting 
the statute to prohibit porn production would advance the interest of preventing 
profiteering from prostitution, and it would advance a public health purpose, 
namely the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases.67 The California Su-
preme Court rejected both rationales. 
Punishment of a motion picture producer for the making of a nonobscene film, 
however, has little if anything to do with the purpose of combatting prostitution. 
Rather, the self-evident purpose of the prosecuting authority in bringing these 
charges was to prevent profiteering in pornography without the necessity of 
proving obscenity. The fact that the People concede that a film identical to that 
in this case could be made lawfully if the performers were not paid also belies 
the asserted “public health” interest. Both these suggested “interests” not only 
directly involve the suppression of free expression but are, in the context of a 
pandering prosecution for the making of a nonobscene motion picture, not cred-
ible.68
Therefore, even amending the statute to remove the gratification require-
ment would not permit prosecution of adult film producers as pimps. As long as 
the acts being filmed were otherwise lawful, and there was no other independ-
ent basis for prosecution (for example, filming in public or a lack of consent), 
then the state had no interest in prohibiting the production of a porn film, and 
the First Amendment would tolerate no such interference. 
3. Censors’ Last Gasp—Appeal to the Supreme Court, and Justice
O’Connor’s Denial
Freeman has been influential outside California—far more than might be 
expected of a mere state supreme court case. This is not only because of its in-
dependent analysis, but also at least in some part, due to the state’s efforts to 
have the decision set aside. After the order, California sought a stay of the 
Freeman decision from the United States Supreme Court, with Justice 
O’Connor as Circuit Justice.69
Justice O’Connor denied the stay, noting that even if the Supreme Court 
reversed the decision, upon remand, the California Supreme Court’s statutory 
66  Id. at 1130. 
67  Id. at 1132. 
68  Id. at 1132–33. 
69  California v. Freeman, 488 U.S. 1311 (1989). 
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construction position would still control the outcome.70 Nevertheless, in deny-
ing the stay, Justice O’Connor gave a hint at how she would have held on the 
First Amendment issue. Without explicitly holding so, she seemed to approve 
of the California Supreme Court’s view on end-runs around the First Amend-
ment. 
Justice O’Connor pointed out the California Court’s observation that the 
prosecution seemed ignoble: 
[T]he prosecution of [Freeman] under the pandering statute must be viewed as a
somewhat transparent attempt at an “end run” around the First Amendment and
the state obscenity laws. Landmark decisions of this court and the United States
Supreme Court compel us to reject such an effort.71
Nevertheless, she was obligated to make the decision based only on the 
California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the California statute. The U.S. 
Supreme Court lacked any power to interpret a California law differently than 
the California Supreme Court. As Justice O’Connor wrote, “Interpretations of 
state law by a State’s highest court are, of course, binding upon this Court.”72
Justice O’Connor’s denial of the stay lacks the authority of a decision on 
the merits, and Justice O’Connor did not add any editorial content. Neverthe-
less, a positive reading seems consistent with existing decisions, and she was 
within her rights to criticize the California Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
analysis, had she seen fit to do so. Given that Justice O’Connor declined to do 
so, and she seemed to disapprove of the prosecution, the Freeman decision has 
a bit more robust effect outside California’s borders. It is, therefore, somewhat 
more powerful than a mere State Supreme Court decision—but no one should 
mistake Justice O’Connor’s denial of the stay as binding precedent. 
III. LIVE FREE OR DIE—NEW HAMPSHIRE
New Hampshire is not the first place that comes to mind when one thinks 
of the adult entertainment industry.73 Nevertheless, ever since 2008, the indus-
try has looked at it, at least out of the corner of its eye, as the only state with an 
explicit Freeman-style court decision. 
70  Id. at 1315. 
71  Id. at 1314. 
72  Id. at 1313 (citations omitted). 
73  New Hampshire does box above its weight class when it comes to porn production. It is 
the home to Wasteland Productions, one of the adult entertainment industry’s first online 
companies, led by Colin Rowntree, a member of the Adult Video News Hall of Fame. See, 
e.g., Charlie Warzel, If They Build It, Will We Come? Meet the Tech Entrepreneurs Trying to
Take Back the Porn Industry, BUZZFEED, (Sept. 24, 2015, 5:31 AM), http://www.buzz
feed.com/charliewarzel/if-they-build-it-will-we-come-meet-the-tech-entrepreneurs-
tr#.arJ3bbJD0 [https://perma.cc/EQU5-M4Q4].
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For the twenty years following Freeman, the decision seemed to stand as 
an instruction to prosecutors nationwide that porn is not prostitution.74 Or at
least it seems this way, because there are no reported decisions involving at-
tempts to prosecute based on pure film production facts, and this is in light of 
the fact that there is porn production in all fifty states. Anecdotally, there have 
been threats of Freeman-style prosecutions from time to time, but none ever 
made their way to a reported decision, nor even a newspaper article.75
By the time the Freeman decision was almost old enough to shop at one of 
the Granite State’s once vital state liquor stores,76 a New Hampshire prosecutor
decided to try out the long discredited prosecutorial strategy on the theory that 
Freeman was obviously not binding outside California. The result was that the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed Freeman’s logic in State v. Theriault, 
and held that paying someone to act in an adult film was not the same as paying 
a prostitute for sex.77 But the Theriault Court went a bit further. The Court en-
gaged in the same constitutional analysis as Freeman but relied on the New 
Hampshire Constitution.78 This shielded the decision from any possible federal
challenge or appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 
The facts of Theriault are a little less clear than those in Freeman. Robert 
Theriault was working as a court security officer when C.H. and J.S. came into 
the court to pay some fines.79 Theriault learned that the woman was “in a dire
financial situation.”80 He then asked the couple if they “needed employment.”
74  In dicta, a New York court seemed to view Freeman analysis as an obvious conclusion. 
See People v. Paulino, No. 6687/04, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3430, at *14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Aug. 4, 2005). 
75  Recently, officials in some states—like Arizona discussed below—have stated that por-
nographers “could be” prosecuted under state prostitution laws. But even legal experts shy 
away from stating a legal conclusion that pornographers will be or even can be prosecuted. 
See infra Part IV.C. Actual threats of prosecution have been lacking since the 1980s. Randy 
Dotinga, Legal Threats Stalk Adult Sites, WIRED (June 15, 2004, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2004/06/legal-threats-stalk-adult-sites/ [https://perma.cc/MNH6-6U 
U5]; Lori Santos, Meese Says Obscenity Team Will Prosecute Pornographers, BRYAN
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1986, at 10; Douglas Shuit & Paul Jacobs, Law Likely to Lead to Stronger 
Curbs on Pornographers, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-04-
16/news/mn-46_1_california-law [https://perma.cc/U6EB-LXLC]. 
76  For many years, Massachusetts prohibited the sale of alcohol on Sundays. New Hamp-
shire’s state liquor stores, conveniently located along the highways from Massachusetts, 
served a valuable societal service. Jenna Russell, Sunday Liquor Sale Ban to End, BOSTON 
GLOBE (Nov. 23, 2003), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2003/11/23/sun 
day_liquor_sale_ban_to_end/ [https://perma.cc/FXT8-VT2N]. 
77  State v. Theriault, 960 A.2d 687, 692 (N.H. 2008). 
78  Id. New Hampshire looks to its state constitution before engaging in an analysis of any 
federal counterparts. See id. at 693. 
79  Id. at 688. 
80  State v. Theriault, 949 A.2d 678, 679 (N.H. 2008) Note this is a separate appeal in which
Theriault’s conviction on other charges, not including videotaping, was upheld. 
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After informing them that he could not discuss the job at the courthouse, he met 
them in a parking lot behind a bank. The defendant asked the couple if they 
wanted to make “f . . . flicks.” The defendant specified the details: he would pay 
them fifty dollars per hour, he would rent a hotel room, and they would use tem-
perature blankets and different condoms while the defendant videotaped them 
having intercourse.81
If that sounds shady, at least Theriault conditioned the offer on the taping 
taking place in a private hotel room “so [they] didn’t feel uncomfortable.”82
The State charged him with violating the prostitution statute by offering to pay 
another to engage in sexual contact.83
The State Supreme Court succinctly summarized the issues as follows: 
The facts boil down to the defendant offering to remunerate the couple to have 
sexual intercourse while being videotaped. There was no evidence or allegation 
that the defendant solicited this activity for the purpose of sexual arousal or grat-
ification as opposed to making a video. The State did not charge the defendant 
under the “sexual contact” portion of the statute and therefore there was no find-
ing by the trial court that the defendant acted for the purpose of sexual arousal or 
gratification. Thus, if the statute constitutionally prohibits the defendant’s con-
duct, a request to pay two individuals to make a sexually explicit video would be 
unprotected under the free speech guarantees of the State Constitution.84
Despite Theriault’s unorthodox proposal, there was no evidence that his of-
fer was anything other than good clean American porn production. “C.H. testi-
fied that [Theriault] offered to pay fifty dollars per hour ‘to make pornogra-
phy.’ The only evidence in this record as to [his] intent is that he intended to 
make pornography.”85
The Theriault court then ran over well-traveled legal ground. The Court 
noted that Miller v. California86 and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition87 estab-
lished that pornography could be banned only if it is deemed legally obscene.88
The Court recognized the Freeman straw man—that adding a camera to a crime 
does not make it into protected expression.89 The New Hampshire Supreme
81  Theriault, 960 A.2d at 688. 
82  Id. at 690. 
83  Id. at 688. 
84  Id. at 690. 
85  Id. at 692. 
86  Miller defines the standard for obscenity as an exception to First Amendment speech pro-
tections. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973). A court must consider if the work ap-
peals to the prurient interest, depicts or describes sexual conduct in an offensive manner un-
der applicable state law, and whether, as a whole, the work lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value. Id. at 24. 
87  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002). Under Ashcroft even a child 
pornography statute can be found overbroad and unconstitutional if it reaches protected 
speech. Id. 
88  Theriault, 960 A.2d at 690. 
89  Id. at 692. 
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Court then burned the straw man by making the obvious finding that filming a 
crime does not automatically transform it into protected activity.90 The Court
made it clear that creation of expressive materials is a special case.91 In other
words, in the case of pornography, the actors are paid to be in the film, not for 
the sexual act. They are, therefore, not filming a crime of prostitution, they are 
just filming a sexual performance, and prohibiting this would be an unjustified 
infringement upon free expression.92 Accordingly, the state could not use the
prostitution statute as a back door prohibition on adult film production. New 
Hampshire followed Freeman to its inevitable conclusion. 
IV. OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA AND NEW HAMPSHIRE
The “Billy Madisons” of the legal world already know what we have gone 
through thus far—California and New Hampshire have decisions that make 
porn production legal in those states.93 But what about other states? The fact is,
there are no decisions outside California and New Hampshire that explicitly 
adopt Freeman, thus, leading to the myth that it is illegal to film pornography 
anywhere else. But, this is not the case. 
For example, Nevada has a favorable legislative history in its prostitution 
statute that recognizes Freeman.94 Beyond Nevada, some states have decisions
containing strong dicta that suggests porn production is permitted (i.e., New 
York95 and Arizona).96 Other states have cases involving live sex shows that
either make it clear that the state would permit porn production (Oregon)97 or
imply as much (Arizona).98 In others, like Missouri, the result is less certain, at
least from a statutory construction perspective.99 But, ultimately, the First
Amendment analysis from Freeman suggests that porn production is almost 
certainly protected activity in all fifty states. 
A. Nevada—Legislative History Adopts Freeman
Nevada has never been a stranger to “sin-based” businesses, and it has long 
been home to adult film production.100 Once the adult industry began looking
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 690. 
92  Id. at 692. 
93  See Theriault, 960 A.2d. at 688; People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Cal. 1988); see 
also supra Parts II–III. 
94  See infra Part IV.A. 
95  See infra Part IV.B. 
96  See infra Part IV.C. 
97  See infra Part IV.D. 
98  See infra Part IV.C. 
99  See infra Part IV.F. 
100  Las Vegas’ nickname of “Sin City” does not simply derive from its gambling attractions. 
The Author has represented companies using Las Vegas as a location for porn production 
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for a new home, Las Vegas was an obvious name on the short list. Clyde 
DeWitt, a veteran adult industry attorney, confirmed to the Las Vegas Sun that 
the Las Vegas valley is a reasonable place for the porn industry to relocate.101
“Las Vegas and Clark County have both licensed adult motion picture studios, 
and within the last year, a major porn production company set up shop in 
Southern Nevada.”102 Many found that creating a greater presence in Nevada
just made good business sense, even if California re-welcomed them. DeWitt 
said that “the economy is so much more favorable . . . . They get commercial 
space cheaper. There’s no state income tax . . . Housing is literally half or less 
than what they pay [in California]. That’s an attractive proposition.”103
DeWitt is not the only prominent Las Vegan to welcome the industry—
local politicians are even receptive. Whereas politicians in most municipalities 
would not want (or pretend to not want) the adult entertainment industry to 
come to their town in the interest of being re-elected, Las Vegas politicians 
have reacted differently. Last year Clark County commissioner Chris 
Giunchigliani commented on the issue, stating that “[i]t’s a legalized industry 
and properly regulated, so I don’t see it as a problem . . . . I think the city and 
the county will benefit from any expansion of the film industry. It’s economic 
diversification.”104 In fact, Clark County even has an adult film studio accom-
modation in its zoning code.105 It would make little sense for the state’s largest
municipality to create licensing and zoning regulations for a business activity 
that could be deemed contrary to state law. 
Of course, Nevada allows prostitution in certain counties. Therefore, the 
whole Freeman/Theriault analysis might seem unnecessary. Yet contrary to 
popular belief—and perhaps as a matter of disappointment to millions of con-
ventioneers—prostitution is not legal in Las Vegas or Reno, the two biggest cit-
ies (by far) in the state. Nevada bans prostitution in counties with more than 
700,000 residents.106 Further, even in rural counties, prostitution is permitted
only in licensed brothels that adhere to strict operating requirements.107
sine the early 2000s, and with mentors in the industry going back to the 1970s, it has been 
common knowledge in the adult industry that Vegas is frequently used for location shooting. 
101  Joe Schoenmann, ACTION! New Los Angeles Ordinance Likely to Drive More Porn In-
dustry Producers to Las Vegas, L.V. SUN (Mar. 6, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://lasvegas 
sun.com/news/2012/mar/06/l-ordinance-likely-drive-more-porn-producers-las-v/ [https://per 
ma.cc/W25B-8N5H]. 
102  Id. 
103  Id.; see also Randazza, supra note 12; Porn Production Moves to Vegas After Condom 
Law, USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2014, 12:11 PM) [hereinafter Porn Production Moves], 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/17/porn-production-vegas/4557957 
[https://perma.cc/DN82-3DR6]. 
104  Porn Production Moves, supra note 104. 
105  CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE § 30.44-1 (2014). 
106  NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.345 (2016). 
107  See, e.g., id. §§ 244.345, 201.380, 201.390. 
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Certainly, in the event that a porn company wanted to film in Nevada, it 
could set up in Pahrump, after opening its own brothel—but given the myriad 
of brothel-specific regulations that need to be followed, this would be wildly 
impractical. Further, if Nevada were to implicitly adopt Freeman, the state 
could not require adult film production to take place only in brothels.108
To make it even more clear that there would be no need to do so, the Ne-
vada prostitution statute historically contained the same gratification require-
ments as California and New Hampshire.109 The statute defines a “prostitute” as
a person who engages in sex with another person, for a fee, for the purpose of 
arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either person.110 Accordingly, unless
the English language has markedly different definitions in New Hampshire and 
California than it has in Nevada, it would seem that Nevada’s courts would be 
compelled to come to the same statutory construction analysis as their counter-
parts—that is, if a porn production ever came under a prosecutor’s eye. 
But, for a brief moment, it seemed that there was a desire to challenge the 
Freeman language in Nevada’s statute, with the potential to set off a constitu-
tional showdown. In 2013, the Nevada assembly proposed a human-trafficking 
bill, AB 67.111 In the lengthy bill, there was a clever attempt to remove the
“gratification” requirement from the prostitution statute, thus, opening the door 
(at least statutorily) to claims that Freeman did not apply in Nevada.112 Under
the bill, the definition changed to a person who “for a fee, monetary considera-
tion or other thing of value engages in sexual intercourse.”113 A later committee
meeting on the bill made clear that, “nothing in the bill was intended to crimi-
nalize First Amendment-protected activity such as films, speech, or consenting 
108  While there is little First Amendment jurisprudence in Nevada Supreme Court decisions, 
a recent case gives us insight into whether burdening porn producers with the requirement of 
only shooting in brothels instead of in studios would be met with approval. See Busefink v. 
State, 286 P.3d 599, 602 (Nev. 2012) (“[T]he Free Speech Clause prohibits the State from 
significantly burdening potential speakers with financial disincentives to speak . . . .”). A 
brothel studio requirement would certainly run afoul of this logic. 
109  As an example, Oregon has a gratification requirement as well. See OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 167.002 (2016) (“ ‘Sexual contact’ means any touching of the sexual organs or other inti-
mate parts. . . for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party.”).
Others do not. See FLA. STAT. § 796.07 (2016) (“any indecent or obscene act”); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3211 (2010) (“ ‘Sexual conduct’ means sexual contact, sexual intercourse,
oral sexual contact or sadomasochistic abuse.”); TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.01 (2015) (“ ‘Sexual
conduct’ includes deviate sexual intercourse, sexual contact, and sexual intercourse.”).
110  NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.295 (2016). 
111  A.B. 67, 2013 Leg., 77th Sess. (Nev. 2013), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Sessi 
on/77th2013/Bills/AB/AB67_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV M4-4GZX] (“Sections . . . of this 
bill amend various provisions relating to the crimes of pandering, involuntary servitude and 
trafficking in persons.”). 
112  Id. 
113  Id. Emphasis omitted. 
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adult actors engaging in sexual conduct.”114 Immediately thereafter, Assembly
Amendment 793 extinguished the change, leaving the prostitution language in 
its original form.115 Accordingly, not only does the Nevada prostitution statute
not presently encompass adult film production, but the legislative intent was to 
protect it as expressive activity.116
Of course, given the Freeman First Amendment analysis, such legislative 
intent may not matter. Even if AB 67 had changed Nevada’s prostitution statute 
to encompass adult film production, it is unlikely that the Nevada Courts could 
have disagreed with the Freeman Court’s First Amendment analysis.117 Given
Freeman, and the AB 67 legislative history, a claim that you cannot shoot porn 
in Nevada would not be credible. Considering the specific zoning for adult film 
production facilities in Clark County, political warmth toward the industry, and 
a general libertarian attitude in Nevada,118 this should dispel any claims that
filming porn in Nevada is either illegal or inadvisable. 
B. New York—Fugghedaboudit—You Can Make It Here
In the 1970s, one New York trial court’s decision supported the “porn 
equals prostitution” conclusion. However, it never gained traction, and to the 
extent it had any credit at all, it was well discredited by 2005. 
1. People v. Kovner—Porn is Prostitution
New York’s pre-Freeman decision, People v. Kovner,119 if considered in
isolation, could provide a chilly welcome to the adult film industry. Still, a later 
decision, People v. Paulino,120 discredits any notion that Kovner is controlling
or persuasive. In fact, the People v. Paulino opinion walks into a bar, locks the 
door, beats the living daylights out of Kovner, and dumps its body on the side 
of the Merritt Parkway.121
114  Hearing on A.B. 67 Before the Assemb. Ways & Means Comm., 2013 Leg., 77th Sess. 7 
(Nev. 2013) [hereinafter Assembly Hearing on A.B. 67]; see also Hearing on A.B. 67 Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 77th Sess. 8 (Nev. 2013) [hereinafter Senate 
Hearing on A.B. 67]. 
115  Nev. A.B. 67. 
116  Assembly Hearing on A.B. 67, supra note 115, at 7; see also Senate Hearing on A.B. 67, 
supra note 115, at 8. 
117  See, e.g., Silvar v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 P.3d 682 (Nev. 2006) (finding a prostitution 
loitering ordinance overbroad under the First Amendment); Julian v. Las Vegas, 493 P.2d 
1037 (Nev. 1972) (adult businesses entitled to obscenity hearing before seizure by officials). 
118  See Nevada, MERCATUS CENTER, http://www.freedominthe50states.org/overall/nevada 
[https://perma.cc/WY2C-HSDB] (noting that “Nevada has a reputation as a libertarian state, 
mostly because of legal prostitution and gambling . . . .”) (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
119  People v. Kovner, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. 1978). 
120  People v. Paulino, No. 6687/04, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 
2005). 
121  See GOODFELLAS (Warner Bros. 1990). 
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To understand Kovner and Paulino, we must return to California, to a time 
before Freeman. Before Freeman, California had People v. Fixler.122 In Fixler,
the defendants were, like Freeman, shooting pornography123 and, also like
Freeman, were convicted of pandering.124 But there was a key distinction: the
actor in their works was fourteen years old.125 The Fixler Court held that even
if the Defendants “intended to use the photographs in a nonobscene publication, 
the fact remains that in order to obtain these photographs they become, by defi-
nition, common panderers and were not immune from prosecution of their 
crimes.”126
The California Appellate Court rejected Fixler’s First Amendment defense 
because the underlying crime, lewd conduct with a minor, was independent of 
the creation of First Amendment protected materials. This distinction aside, 
Freeman explicitly rejected Fixler’s logic that merely paying (adult) actors to 
be in a porn movie could be deemed unlawful when the payment was intended 
for acting services, but not for personal sexual gratification.127
So why do I fixate on Fixler at this point? Because the only New York case 
on point in this discussion is People v. Kovner.128 In that case, a New York trial
court relied on Fixler and found that the prostitution statute could indeed be 
used to prosecute pornography. New York State Supreme Court Justice Robert 
M. Haft appeared to be quite delighted with the idea.129
The People’s theory of the “promoting prostitution” charges is quite novel that a
person may be guilty of promoting prostitution if he “advances or profits” from
the conduct of “actors and actresses” who engage in explicit sexual conduct as
paid performers. This is the first time in this jurisdiction that the prostitution
statute has been utilized in an effort to curb pornography.130
Although Kovner raised the same First Amendment arguments in his de-
fense as did Mr. Freeman, Justice Haft explicitly rejected them. Justice Haft did 
not seem to appreciate that the Fixler prosecution was based on lewd conduct 
with a minor; instead, relying on Fixler, he made a broad pronouncement that 
there was a distinction between production and distribution of First Amend-
ment protected materials.131
122  People v. Fixler, 128 Cal. Rptr. 363 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
123  Id. at 364. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at 365. 
126  Id. at 366. 
127  See supra Part II. 
128  People v. Kovner, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. 1978). 
129  Id. at 350. 
130  Id. (citations omitted). 
131  Id. at 351–52. 
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Justice Haft noted that he was not “unmindful” of the fact that a “literal in-
terpretation of the prostitution laws” could chill First Amendment rights.132
Nevertheless, to Justice Haft, the price was worth the reward. “[W]hen a state 
undertakes to regulate a social evil such as prostitution or pornography, it has a 
greater power to regulate the non-verbal physical conduct which may occur 
than to suppress depictions or descriptions of the same.”133
2. New York Post-Kovner—People v. Paulino
Kovner was only a trial court decision, and Mr. Kovner does not appear to 
have sought an appeal. Nevertheless, from 1978 forward, New York prosecu-
tors could have prosecuted pornographers with at least a trial court decision on 
their side. Without Freeman, there was no impediment to doing so. However, 
there is no record of them having done so. 
Fast forward to 2005 when Jenny Paulino was prosecuted for running an 
escort service, which was actually a front for a prostitution operation.134 Pauli-
no argued that the state was involved in “selective prosecution” for pursuing 
her, “while ignoring ‘Goliath corporations’ ” that “conspicuously reap huge 
profits from the distribution of adult films.”135 Paulino’s point was that prose-
cuting a little escort agency, while leaving porn producers alone, was unequal 
treatment. 
Justice Emily Goodman was having none of it: 
The defendant’s entire motion hinges on a single, stale, faulty, and non-
precedential decision. The defendant cites People v. Kovner for the proposition 
that a film-maker, who pays actors and actresses to engage in sexual conduct for 
“pictorial recordation.” [sic] is as guilty of promoting prostitution as are his par-
ticipants. Kovner concluded that “no legal distinction” existed between a man 
who paid for sexual activity to be performed on him and a non-participating 
third party who paid for an actor to participate in sexual activity, because both 
involved the essential elements of prostitution: sexual activity in exchange for a 
fee.136
Goodman was not content to leave it at “single, stale, and faulty.” She con-
tinued by questioning why, in the face of Kovner, there had not been a “torrent 
of prosecution against media companies for paying actors to star in porno-
graphic motion pictures.”137 Goodman had an answer to her own rhetorical
question: “This flood never materialized because Kovner’s definition of prosti-
132  Id. at 352. 
133  Id. 
134  People v. Paulino, No. 6687/04, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3430, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 
4, 2005). 
135  Id. at *5–7. 
136  Id. at *8 (citations omitted). 
137  Id. at *9. 
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tution is as novel as it is unjustifiably broad.”138 She then described how the
traditional notion of prostitution is a bilateral arrangement—A pays B for sexu-
al activity to be performed on A.139 She then ridiculed the Kovner decision for
enlarging the scope of the crime to prohibit C, from paying B for sexual activi-
ty to be performed on A.140
Given that this was all dicta anyway, Goodman could have left it at that. 
Kovner was already an ignored derelict on the sea of jurisprudence, and Justice 
Goodman must have known that the case that provided Kovner’s very spine, 
Fixler, had been done away with in Freeman.141 Nevertheless, without citing
Freeman once, Goodman wrote her own First Amendment treatment of the 
“porn is prostitution” theory. She made it clear that Ms. Paulino’s escort service 
could be prosecuted without fear of offending the First Amendment. Mean-
while, prosecuting adult film companies “poses thorny First Amendment is-
sues, which do not arise in prosecuting brothels.”142 She further recognized that
the state would bear a heavy constitutional burden if it prosecuted an adult film 
producer who is “shielded by the First Amendment.”143 She contrasted this with
“prosecuting a brothel with no such constitutional armor.”144
Accordingly, for a period of time in New York, one could have argued that 
in the absence of any other authority, Kovner green lighted adult film prosecu-
tions in the Empire State. But, as Justice Goodman pointed out, none material-
ized.145 Once Freeman wiped Fixler off the map, the last of Kovner’s remote
underpinnings collapsed, rendering it, as Goodman said, “single, stale, [and] 
faulty.”146
C. Arizona—Live Sex Shows are a “No-No”, but Freeman is a “Go-Go”
In 2012, Maricopa County Attorney Bill Montgomery told the press that 
under Arizona law, being paid to be in a porn movie could constitute prostitu-
tion, and that Arizona law precludes the establishment of an Arizona porn in-
dustry.147 Maricopa County is no stranger to conservative law enforcement
138  Id. 
139  Id. at *8. 
140  Id. at *8–9. 
141  Presumably, Justice Goodman was familiar with Freeman’s existence as it was the lead-
ing case on the issue. One would have to consciously avoid it in order to be unaware of it. 
142  Paulino, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3430 at *12. 
143  Id. at *13. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. at *8–9. 
146  Id. at *8. 
147  Press Release, Maricopa Cty. Att’y’s Office, Cty. Att’y Comments on Possible Move of 
Cal. Pornographic Film Prod. to Ariz. (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.maricopacountyattor 
ney.org/newsroom/news-releases/2012/2012-03-13-County-Attorney-Comments-on-Move-
of-Pornographic-Film-Production-to-Arizona.html [https://perma.cc/HS9U-U3X8]; Matthew 
Hendley, Bill Montgomery’s Warning to the Porn Industry: Filming Nudie Flicks in Arizona 
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making such broad pronouncements, but was Montgomery correct? Not likely, 
but he at least has a shred of credibility.  
Arizona does have a much broader definition of prostitution than Califor-
nia, and thus, adult film production arguably fits the statute.148 There is a dearth
of case law providing any instruction, but there is an appellate case in Arizona 
examining Freeman.149 This case, State v. Taylor, suggests (without explicitly
saying so) that porn producers can roll film from Winslow to Bisbee and eve-
rywhere in between. 
1. Statutorily, Porn is Probably Prostitution in Arizona
Arizona’s prostitution statutes are more conduct-restrictive than those in 
California, New Hampshire, and Nevada, which could support Montgomery’s 
statement. Arizona defines prostitution as “engaging in or agreeing or offering 
to engage in sexual conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for mon-
ey or any other valuable consideration.”150 Furthermore, a prostitution enter-
prise is defined as “any corporation, partnership, association or other legal enti-
ty or any group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity 
engaged in providing prostitution services.”151 Both definitions seem to cover
pornography production. Moreover, under Arizona law, “prostitution” and 
“lewdness” are separate terms. For instance, “ ‘[h]ouse of prostitution’ means 
any building, structure or place that is used for the purpose of prostitution or 
lewdness or where acts of prostitution occur.”152 Lewd also appears in the defi-
nition of “sexual activity” but not “sexual conduct” under Arizona law.153 Only
“sexual conduct” is required for prostitution.154 Thus, it is not farfetched to
think an Arizona court could conclude that an act does not have to be for pur-
pose of “sexual arousal or gratification” to constitute prostitution.155
Accordingly, if a porn producer faced prosecution in Phoenix for prostitu-
tion, the first half of the Freeman analysis might be of little comfort. Neverthe-
less, it does seem that beyond the text of the prostitution statutes, we can have a 
pornography set with the Grand Canyon in the background. 
May Be Prostitution (Even Though It’s Been Happening Here for Years), PHX. NEW TIMES 
(Mar. 13, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/bill-montgomerys-
warning-to-the-porn-industry-filming-nudie-flicks-in-arizona-may-be-prostitution-even-
though-its-been-happening-here-for-years-6642565 [https://perma.cc/5SPY-UA84].  
148  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3211 (2010). 
149  See State v. Taylor, 808 P.2d 314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). 
150  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3211. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. (emphasis added). 
153  Compare id., with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3501 (2010). 
154  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3211. 
155  Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3211, with People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128 (Cal. 
1988) (discussing the California statutory definition of “prostitution,” “sexual conduct,” and 
a “lewd act”). 
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2. Constitutionally, Arizona is Probably Safe for Adult Film
Arizona’s Constitution gives greater protection to free speech than the Fed-
eral Constitution.156 Article 2, Section 6 of the Arizona State Constitution pro-
scribes “[e]very person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, be-
ing responsible for the abuse of that right.”157 This text grants freedom of
expression to the people of Arizona, rather than acting as a restriction on gov-
ernment, as does the First Amendment. 
Given that speech in Arizona is freer than the First Amendment requires,158
one would assume that Arizona courts would be apt to look at the second half 
of the Freeman decision and feel compelled to stand alongside California159
and New Hampshire, at least on constitutional principle.160
We do not need to completely speculate. In 1990, the Arizona Court of 
Appeals hinted that Freeman may apply in Arizona. In State v. Taylor,161 a per-
former was convicted of prostitution for performing in a “sex show theatre.”162
The shows were “semi-private,” and the viewing room was about the size of a 
closet with a glass window.163 Customers inserted money into a slot to keep the
show going and to encourage the performers to provide a more robust viewing 
experience for the limited audience.164
On appeal, the Court stated, “Freeman is considerably different from this 
case” because, in Freeman, there was no “payment for the purpose of sexual 
arousal or gratification.”165 Apparently, the up-close and personal nature of the
show in Taylor was a little too gratifying for the audience members. The Ari-
zona Court of Appeals also seemed to cast an approving gaze toward the crea-
156  See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. Co. v. Ariz. Corp., 773 P.2d 455, 459 (Ariz. 1989). 
157  ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 6. 
158  See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. Co., 773 P.2d at 459 (“§ 6 may offer substantially more 
protection to free expression . . . .”); see also, Phx. Newspapers, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 418 P.2d 
594, 596 (Ariz. 1966); Empress Adult Video & Bookstore v. Tucson, 59 P.3d 814, 818 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Martin v. Reinstein, 987 P.2d 779, 788 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). 
159  The Arizona constitution is modeled after Washington’s. “Article 2, section 6 of the Ari-
zona Constitution of 1910, enacted after ours, is identical to Washington’s free speech provi-
sion.” State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353, 361 (Wash. 1984). In turn, that is modeled after Califor-
nia’s. “Const. art. 1, § 5 [of the Washington Constitution] was modeled after the California 
provision.” Id. 
160  Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863 (Ariz. 2012) (holding that tattooing constituted 
protected speech); State v. Boehler, 262 P.3d 637 (Ariz. 2011) (invalidating a panhandlers 
statute as not being narrowly tailored); State v. Stummer, 194 P.3d 1043 (Ariz. 2008) (re-
versing convictions under a statute requiring adult bookstores to close between the hours of 
1:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.); State v. Western, 812 P.2d 987 (Ariz. 1991) (invalidating several 
ordinances banning stripteases for vagueness). 
161  State v. Taylor, 808 P.2d 314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). 
162  Id. at 315. 
163  Id. at 315, 318. 
164  Id. at 315. 
165  Id. at 317. 
122 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:97 
tion of adult films in Arizona by making the key distinction that there was no 
such medium in the live sex acts at issue.166
There was no film here as in Freeman to distance the observer temporally and 
physically from the performers; here the customer was temporally present, dis-
tanced only by the intervening glass. In Freeman the film was the commercial 
product, an inescapable subject of obscenity analysis. Here the commercial 
product was a live sex show in a setting that facilitated and explicitly encour-
aged masturbation.167
The Arizona Court of Appeals would not support a conviction by holding 
Freeman out as a positive example, while simultaneously disapproving of a live 
sex show, if it were not implicitly adopting Freeman’s rationale.168
The Taylor court did not stop there. While the facts of Taylor include a 
close encounter under the guise of a sex show, the Arizona Court made it clear 
that legitimate theatrical productions featuring sex shows would have to be left 
alone. 
There are few definitional difficulties in a law that prohibits charging the cus-
tomers to have sex with the actors. Voyeurism, however, unlike participatory 
sex, is a common element of theatre, and eros is an element of human nature that 
theatrical producers, performers, and patrons are constitutionally at liberty to 
explore. Thus, there are obvious definitional and constitutional difficulties in a 
law that prohibits charging a customer to watch what might be an erotic or a 
sexually arousing show.169
This rationale is not only similar to Freeman, but seems to take one step 
beyond Freeman in saying that when live sex shows are truly theatrical produc-
tions, and not just a ruse, they would have to be allowed. 
Taylor does not cleanly state outright that Arizona law specifically adopts 
Freeman. Nevertheless, the Court’s reasoning acknowledges constitutional 
166  Id. 
167  Id. at 318. 
168  Other Arizona cases support this rationale by providing different treatment for different 
types of sexual speech. See, e.g., State v. Bauer, 768 P.2d 175, 187 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) 
(reinstating a license for an adult bookstore where the store owner was convicted of selling 
obscene books). In Bauer, the court noted that the state went too far in prohibiting all adult 
material because “one obscene book on the premises of a bookstore does not make an entire 
store obscene,” and the state should be wary of making such prior restraints. Id. at 183; see 
also Collins v. Sup. Ct., 787 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Ariz. 1986) (Feldman, J., dissenting) (“We 
must remember that while the Constitution does not protect obscenity, it does protect many 
types of speech which a majority may think objectionable. For instance, sexual conduct may 
be explicitly described and still fall within the constitutional protection of the first amend-
ment.”); State v. Mutschler, 65 P.3d 469, 474 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing that some 
nude and erotic dancing is protected under the “outer perimeters of the First Amendment” 
but drawing the line at “live sex act businesses.”); State v. Jones, 865 P.2d 138, 143 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1993) (“The law is settled that dancing is a protected form of expression; even nude 
dancing enjoys some protection.”). 
169  Taylor, 808 P.2d at 318. 
Fall 2016] THE FREEDOM TO FILM PORNOGRAPHY 123 
problems that come from a failure to follow Freeman.170 The Court likely made
this decision based on its own constitutional instincts and not the statutory con-
struction itself, as Arizona’s prostitution statute is more conservative than Cali-
fornia’s—covering mere sexual contact or “lewd acts between persons for 
money or other consideration.”171
Accordingly, any decision to prosecute an adult film producer for prostitu-
tion in Arizona would run up against the First Amendment considerations that 
Freeman relied upon, as well as Taylor’s implicit adoption of Freeman’s con-
stitutional analysis. Arizona, in light of Taylor, obviously has a policy against 
extending free expression protection to pretextual live performances, but its 
broad constitutional treatment is also likely to hinder prosecution of legitimate 
adult film producers, just as it would bar prosecution of legitimate live theatri-
cal acts involving sexual conduct. It simply makes little sense that the Arizona 
Court of Appeals would point to legitimate live sex productions as protected, 
but would hold differently if there were film involved. 
D. Oregon: Anything Goes—Even Live Sex Shows
Oregon is well known as a speech-friendly state.172 Therefore, it is little
surprise that Oregon’s free speech protections are so strong that Oregon blows 
right past California and New Hampshire with case law that says that even up-
close live sex acts are permissible. 
Oregon’s prostitution statute173 and constitutional free speech protections
include language that is similar to many other states.174 Nevertheless, the Ore-
170  Id. 
171  CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2010). 
172  State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 619 (Or. 2005) (holding that the Oregon Constitution 
“precludes . . . laws directed at limiting or restricting any conceivable kind of communica-
tion.”). In fact, the Oregon Constitution’s free expression protections are so strong that even 
“proximity” rules in strip clubs have been held to be unconstitutional there. See City of 
Nyssa v. Dufloth, 121 P.3d 639 (Or. 2005); see also Adam Rick, First Amendment, Second 
Fiddle? Free Speech in New Hampshire’s Constitution, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 373, 402 (2009). 
173  Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 167.007 (2016) (“A person commits the crime of prostitution 
if the person engages in, or offers or agrees to engage in, sexual conduct or sexual contact in 
return for a fee.”), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3211 (2010) (“ ‘Prostitution’ means en-
gaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct under a fee arrangement with 
any person for money or any other valuable consideration.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-70-102 
(2011 & Supp. 2013) (“A person commits prostitution if in return for or in expectation of a 
fee he or she engages in or agrees or offers to engage in sexual activity with any other per-
son.”); CONN. PENAL CODE § 53a-82 (2015) (“A person sixteen years of age or older is guilty 
of prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct 
with another person in return for a fee.”). 
174  Compare OR. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“No law shall be passed restraining the free expression 
of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but 
every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.”), with ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 6 
(“Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the 
abuse of that right.”); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“Every person may freely speak, write and 
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gon Supreme Court has interpreted the Oregon Constitution’s language as pro-
tecting more speech than the Federal Constitution.175 In fact, Oregon’s Consti-
tution arguably provides the most robust protection for free expression in the 
United States.176 The Oregon Supreme Court consistently reminds us that Ore-
gon takes free expression seriously.177 In fact, Oregon’s Constitution goes so
far as to act as a bar to prosecutions for obscenity, under state law.178 It pro-
vides “much broader protection to adult entertainment establishments, even to 
the point of allowing live sex shows.”179
Oregon confronted its own Taylor situation in State v. Ciancanelli.180 The
Oregon Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, addressed the question of whether a 
statute prohibiting live sex acts violated the Oregon free expression clause. 
There, the  defendant was convicted under section 167.062 of the Oregon Re-
vised Statute181 for operating a business that offered a “menu” of live sex per-
formances, a for-profit service.182 The “menu” suggested that the financial ex-
change was for gratification, and that the “performance” was a mere pretext.183
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.”); 
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“Every person may speak, write and publish sentiments on all sub-
jects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right.”); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Every 
citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being re-
sponsible for the abuse of that right . . . .”). 
175  See, e.g., In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 46 (Or. 1990) (“The text of Article I, section 8, is 
broader [than the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution] . . . .”) (emphasis added); 
Deras v. Myers, 535 P.2d 541, 549 n.17 (Or. 1975) (“The difference in the language of the 
Oregon and federal constitutions may also be pointed to as indicating an intention to provide 
a larger measure of protection to free expression under the Oregon Constitution.”) (emphasis 
added). 
176  “In [Oregon] any person can write, print, read, say, show or sell anything to a consenting 
adult . . . .” State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 18 (Or. 1987). Compare this with a state like Florida 
where the state constitution only protects the same amount of speech as the federal constitu-
tion. See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
177  See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 191 P.3d 665, 669 (Or. 2008) (“[T]he state may not suppress 
all speech that offends with the club of criminal law.”); Henry, 732 P.2d at 10; State v. Rob-
ertson, 649 P.2d 569, 576 (Or. 1982) (explaining the Oregon Constitution “forecloses the 
enactment of any law written in terms directed to the substance of any ‘opinion’ or any ‘sub-
ject’ of communication, unless the scope of the restraint is wholly confined within some his-
torical exception.”). 
178  Henry, 732 P.2d at 16. 
179  Cam I, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, Nos. 2005-CA-000085-MR, 2005-
CA-000090-MR, 2005-CA-000091-MR, 2005-CA-000092-MR, 2005-CA-000100-MR, 
2005-CA-000113-MR, 2005-CA-000176-MR, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 370 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 
5, 2007). 
180  State v. Ciancanelli, 45 P.3d 451, 452 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
181  OR. REV. STAT. § 167.062(3) (2016) (“It is unlawful for any person to knowingly direct, 
manage, finance or present a live public show in which the participants engage in . . . sexual 
conduct.”). 
182  State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 615 (Or. 2005). 
183  Ciancanelli, 45 P.3d at 476. 
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This is the very type of scenario that the Arizona Court of Appeals disapproved 
of in Taylor. 
The Oregon Constitution, robust as it is, permits certain prohibitions on 
expression if there is a well-established, historical basis for the otherwise pro-
tected content.184 The Court of Appeals reviewed the conduct under this test
(known as the Robertson test) to determine if there was a well-established, his-
torical restriction on public sexual acts and, if so, whether that restriction en-
compassed the entire statute.185 
After a lengthy analysis of the history of public nudity laws in the United 
States tracing back to early colonial times, the Court concluded that the statute 
fell under a long-held, historic “authority to regulate public sexual conduct.” 186
Furthermore, “[t]here [was] no argument that defendant’s conduct did not 
amount to promoting prostitution.”187
In scathing separate dissenting opinions, Judges Brewer188 and Armstrong
argued that the majority ignored Oregon Supreme Court precedent.189 Both dis-
sents relied heavily on State v. Henry, where an adult bookstore owner was 
convicted under section 167.087 of the Oregon Revised Statute for disseminat-
ing obscene material.190 In Henry, the Court found “that characterizing expres-
sion as ‘obscenity’ under any definition . . . does not deprive it of protection 
under the Oregon Constitution.”191 Armstrong went on to say, “[a]lthough peo-
ple generally can be held liable for criminal acts committed while engaged in 
expressive activity, some criminal laws cannot constitutionally be applied to 
people engaged in expressive activity,” including live sexual performances.192
Furthermore, Robertson requires a history of crimes that address “tangible 
harm,” like fraud.193 “[S]exual content of shows presented to an audience of
willing adult viewers” is not one of those tangible harms.194 According to Judge
Armstrong’s dissent in particular, the Ciancanelli majority should only have 
looked at laws that restricted expression and questioned whether those laws 
were meant to survive adoption of the free speech provision of the Oregon 
Constitution.195
184  See State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 576 (Or. 1982). 
185  Ciancanelli, 45 P.3d at 452–53. 
186  Id. at 458, 466. 
187  Id. at 466. 
188  Judge Brewer was joined by Judge Wollheim. Id. at 467, 476. 
189  Id. at 476. The Henry court reviewed the history of obscenity and found speech excep-
tions to apply only in certain circumstances and there was no historical ban on obscenity 
generally. State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 16 (Or. 1987). 
190  Ciancanelli, 45 P.3d at 467–80. 
191  Henry, 732 P.2d at 17. 
192  Ciancanelli, 45 P.3d at 477 (Armstrong, J., dissenting). 
193  Id. at 479. 
194  Id. 
195  Id. at 480. 
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On direct review, the Oregon Supreme Court overturned the majority opin-
ion. Although the Court adopted part of Judge Armstrong’s reasoning, it went 
even further, concluding that Article I, Section 8 of the Oregon Constitution 
“precludes any restraint on most forms of expression as well as laws directed at 
limiting or restricting any conceivable kind of communication.”196 In other
words, the Oregon Supreme Court roundly rejected any form of prior restraint 
“whatever,”197 including restrictions on the expressive aspect of live sex
shows.198
Shortly after Ciancanelli, the Oregon Supreme Court developed that juris-
prudence further in the case of City of Nyssa v. Dufloth.199 In particular, the
Court developed what “expression” meant under the Oregon Constitution.200
The City of Nyssa passed an ordinance that required strip clubs to impose a 
“four foot rule,” keeping patrons at least that far away from nude dancers, at all 
times.201 Defendants were arrested based on a complaint that a dancer was
“shaking her hair in a patron’s face.”202 The Appeals Court relied on its own
opinion in Ciancanelli to find that nude dancing was not protected expression 
under the state constitution, and of course was reversed on review.203
The Oregon Constitution “protection extends to the kinds of expression 
that a majority of citizens in many communities would dislike—profanity, 
blasphemy, pornography—and even to physical acts, such as nude dancing or 
other explicit sexual conduct, that have an expressive component.”204 The
Court went further to reject the Ciancanelli proposition that there is a historical 
exception “for laws regulating live public shows involving displays of nudity 
and sexuality.”205 The “four foot rule” ordinance “appli[ed] only to one disfa-
vored type of communication (nude performance) in one disfavored type of es-
tablishment” and thus, was “indistinguishable from . . . Ciancanelli” and di-
rected improperly at free expression.206
196  State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 619 (Or. 2005). 
197  Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution states: “No law shall be passed restraining 
the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any 
subject whatever . . . .” Although section 8 seems to track the language of the First Amend-
ment in part, one of its distinctive features is the word “whatever.” That intensifying lan-
guage is absent from the First Amendment, suggesting section 8 provides protective force 
beyond that federal counterpart. OR. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
198  Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d at 635. 
199  City of Nyssa v. Dufloth, 121 P.3d 639 (Or. 2005). 
200  Id. at 640–41. 
201  Id. at 639. 
202  Id. at 640. 
203  City of Nyssa v. Dufloth, 57 P.3d 161, 163 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 121 P.3d 639 (Or. 
2005). 
204  City of Nyssa, 121 P.3d at 642 (citing State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 629 (Or. 2005)). 
205  Id. at 643. 
206  Id. 
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With increased protection for speech in Oregon case law, the adult film in-
dustry would likely be welcomed there. Oregon brings one more question to the 
table: “If pornography is not prostitution, where do we draw the line?” Oregon 
is sui generis in that its Constitution has been interpreted to mandate that audi-
ence-driven live sex shows and obscenity are protected speech. Most other 
states, though likely to uphold the Freeman standard, make a point to distin-
guish adult film production—or even amateur film production like in Theri-
ault—from live sex shows. 
E. Florida—Sunny or Dark?
Certain parts of Florida “have been a long-time home to some of the [porn] 
industry’s largest content producers.”207 One example, Florida Beach Guy En-
terprises, has produced adult films in St. Augustine since 1994.208 Moreover,
the internationally beloved “Bang Bros” are headquartered in Miami Beach.209
The Tampa Bay and Orlando areas are also home to other well-known porn 
companies.210
But is all of this porn production just one prosecutorial hurricane away 
from being swept away? No sane person would call Florida a speech friendly 
state. Florida’s Supreme Court has consistently reminded us that the Florida 
Constitution provides no greater protection to free speech than the Federal 
Constitution.211 Some Florida counties routinely bring obscenity cases against
207  Walters, supra note 11. 
208  Porn Nearby, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Dec. 2, 2007), http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/sto 
ries/120207/lif_221825643.shtml#.V13V-1dWa0h [https://perma.cc/R3FD-EY8W]. 
209  In the interest of full disclosure, the Author proudly represents Bang Bros. 
210  See, e.g., Biography: It’s Time You Knew a Bit More About Me-My Real Name is Diana 
Tho Many Still Call Me Desi, PORN IN THE VALLEY (Jan. 20, 2012), http://pornintheval 
ley.com/2012/01/20/biography-its-time-you-knew-a-bit-more-about-me-my-real-name-is-
diana-tho-many-still-call-me-desi/ [https://perma.cc/9G6X-M3FF]. In fact, the Tampa Bay 
area is so tolerant of the industry that it has yet to crack down on even the most shocking 
porn production, including an adult mother-daughter team. See David Moye, Mother-
Daughter Porn Duo Jessica Sexxxton, Monica Sexxton Aiming to Be Filthy Rich, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2012, 6:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/06/ 
mother-daughter-porn-duo-jessica-monica-sexxxton_n_2238052.html [https://perma.cc/M4E 
V-V6GR].
211  See, e.g., Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So. 2d 197, 203 (Fla. 1985) (“We do not find 
any greater protection under the Florida Constitution.”); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Ane, 
423 So. 2d 376, 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (“Nor can the decision here be revived, as 
urged, as an interpretation of the Florida Constitution according greater constitutional protec-
tion for defamation defendants than that afforded by the First Amendment . . . .”); Fla. Can-
ners Ass’n v. Fla., Dep’t of Citrus, 371 So. 2d 503, 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (“Under 
the circumstances, and in the absence of any expression by our supreme court that the Flori-
da guarantee [for freedom of speech] is broader in scope than the federal, we conclude that 
the two are the same and will not treat them separately.”). 
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pornographers.212 And, there was at least one case in which a Florida prosecu-
tor seemed primed to give a run at challenging the Freeman analysis in Flori-
da.213 Nevertheless, Florida is a patchwork of conservative and liberal ele-
ments—with Tampa and Miami standing alongside parts of Florida where time 
seems to have stood still. 
1. Polk County
It is safe to say that if anyone would try a Freeman prosecution in Florida, 
it would be Polk County Sherriff, Grady Judd. Sherriff Judd is well known as a 
moral crusader and is as anti-porn as they come.214 Judd prosecuted website
operator Chris Wilson when Wilson’s website came under the spotlight for al-
lowing military members to post photos of Iraqi war dead that showed miscon-
duct by American soldiers.215 Judd charged Wilson with 300 counts of obsceni-
ty due to the hundreds of sexually explicit photos on his website—very few of 
which were more than garden-variety nudity.216
Another infamous Polk County case took place in 1999 where Herbert and 
Tammy Robinson ran an amateur porn website from their home in Polk Coun-
ty, Florida. In the course of publishing the site, they picked up a stalker, who 
threatened to rape and kill Ms. Robinson, while making her children watch.217
Understandably, the Robinsons called the FBI, who referred them to the local 
212  Walters, supra note 11. In Polk County, for example, dozens of cases are brought each 
year. Though many are dismissed, it is a sure way to discourage production of adult films. 
See id. 
213  See Lawrence G. Walters, Anatomy of an Obscenity Prosecution: The Tammy Robinson 
Case Study, FIRSTAMENDMENT.COM, http://www.firstamendment.com/wp-content/uploads/20 
13/pdf/Anatomy%20of%20an%20Obscenity%20Prosecution.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH9H-N 
KKG] (last visited Sept. 27, 2016); see also discussion of Robinson infra Part IV.E.1. 
214  See, e.g., Michael Kruse, Polk Sheriff Grady Judd Makes His Name on Moral Outrage, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 4, 2011, 12:24 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafe 
ty/polk-sheriff-grady-judd-makes-his-name-on-moral-outrage/1149570 [https://perma.cc/4V 
GB-KWXF]; see also Jeff Gore, Church and State: Polk County Sheriff Grady Judd’s Mis-
sion from God to Eliminate Obscenity Knows No Bounds, ORLANDO WEEKLY (Feb. 23, 
2011), http://orlandoweekly.com/news/church-and-state-1.1109454 [https://perma.cc/WP2U-
XX3B]. 
215  David Kushner, Casualty of Porn: Is Chris Wilson Facing Jail Over Amateur Smut or 
Dead Iraqis, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 5, 2005), http://www.firstamendment.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/pdf/Rolling_Stone_11.28.05.pdf [https://perma.cc/993W-QS2A]; Jon-
athan Turley, Chris Wilson’s War: Publisher of Iraqi War Dead Arrested and Computer 
Seized: Was it Porn or Politics?, JONATHANTURLEY.ORG (Jan. 6, 2008), http://jonathantur 
ley.org/2008/01/06/chris-wilsons-war-publisher-of-iraqi-war-dead-arrested-and-computer-
seized-was-it-porn-or-politics [https://perma.cc/MF9Z-SUM2]. 
216  JEFF SPARROW, KILLING: MISADVENTURES IN VIOLENCE 2–3 (2009); Dana Willhoit, War, 
Porn Web Site Creator Arrested, LEDGER (Oct. 8, 2005, 8:53 AM), http://www.theledg 
er.com/article/20051008/NEWS/510080427?p=3&tc=pg [https://perma.cc/UW7H-6CDP]. 
217  JOHN INCE, THE POLITICS OF LUST 194 (Prometheus Books 2005) (2003). 
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“Computer Crimes Unit” in Polk County.218 Upon opening the investigation,
the focus immediately shifted away from the death threats into an obscenity 
prosecution against the victims.219 Judd even kicked off the festivities with a
SWAT Team raid.220
In an act of unethical prosecutorial creativity, Judd pushed the Florida De-
partment of Children and Families to remove the Robinson children from the 
home.221 Ultimately, the case was dropped, and Robinson sued the Polk County
authorities.222 Despite his willingness to stoop to such levels as seizing a porn-
producer’s children, Grady Judd never went so far as to charge the Robinsons 
with prostitution.223 Over the years, Judd has brought his fair share of obscenity
charges,224 but he has never once tried to do a Freeman-style prosecution.225
Given his clear zeal to punish pornographers, one would think that if Florida 
law could support it, he would have charged them with such a crime, or at the 
very least, used it to extract a more favorable plea deal. 
2. Outside Polk
 There have been relatively few other pornography prosecutions outside of 
Polk County. One did occur in 2008 when prosecutors in the Florida Panhandle 
charged porn producer Clinton McCowan, a.k.a. “Ray Guhn,” with obscenity 
and prostitution in connection with his running of an adult film company.226
The prostitution charges were never fully explained, though, and were ultimate-
ly settled out of court.227
218  Walters, supra note 214, at 1. 
219  Id. at 3. 
220  Id. at 4. 
221  Id. 
222  Vickie Chachere, Internet Porn Case Dropped Against Couple, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-J. 
(Feb. 7, 2001), http://lubbockonline.com/stories/020701/upd_075-7363.shtml#.V132W1dWa 
0g [https://perma.cc/TY6G-59LJ]. 
223  Walters, supra note 214, at 4. 
224  See, e.g., Suzie Schottelkotte, Former Lake Wales Couple Plead No Contest in Pornog-
raphy Case, LEDGER (Feb. 28, 2012, 11:51 PM), http://www.theledger.com/article/201202 
28/NEWS/120229245 [https://perma.cc/9UCA-CF42]. 
225 E-mail from Lawrence G. Walters, Att’y, Walters Law Group, to author (Nov. 1, 2015,
3:37 PST) (on file with author). The Author has also interviewed attorneys in Florida who 
regularly represent adult film producers, including Larry Walters, Gary Edinger, Jamie Ben-
jamin, Danny Aaronson, and Luke Lirot. The attorneys all indicated that they know of no 
other similar prosecutions of adult film producers in Florida. See also D. Gill Sperlein, et al., 
Is It Legal to Shoot Porn in Your State?, XBIZ (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.xbiz.com/arti 
cles/177157 [https://perma.cc/DM84-BXAH]. 
226  Anne Winter, Ray Guhn Pleads Not Guilty, XBIZ (Aug. 1, 2007, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.xbiz.com/news/news_piece.php?id=82578 [https://perma.cc/5J58-N52F]. 
227  Media Update—July 7, 2008, NAT’L COAL. SEXUAL FREEDOM, https://ncsfree 
dom.org/please-login-to-kap/item/302-media-update-july-7-2008.html [https://perma.cc/KS4 
H-49VW] (last visited Sept. 27, 2016).
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Even law enforcement officials in conservative Florida counties 
acknowledge that pornography production is difficult to prosecute unless the 
product is obscene.228 Jacksonville Police Lieutenant Mike Gwynes commented
that “[t]here are so many constitutional protections, it’s extremely difficult to 
prosecute . . . . It really has to go way outside society’s norms to come up to the 
level of criminal.”229
Accordingly, despite the lack of any authority, it is relatively safe to say 
that if Florida were prepared to take an anti-Freeman position, it would have 
done so by now. Of course, the fact that it has not doesn’t preclude it from do-
ing so today. But, when even Polk County and Jacksonville are not prepared to 
lay out the porn production dragnet, it is reasonable to assume that the rest of 
the state will remain open for business. 
F. Missouri
Missouri is not exactly a hotbed of porn production. Therefore, one might 
wonder why this study would consider it important enough for inclusion. The 
fact is, there is a lack of case law nationwide challenging any of Freeman’s no-
tions—but Missouri is home to the only case that calls some of Freeman’s pre-
sumptions into question. 
1. Show Me Prostitution
The current version of Missouri’s prostitution statute is somewhat confus-
ing, seeming to be a Freeman-style statute. However, the new version of the 
statute, which comes into effect on January 1, 2017, is tailored to exclude 
Freeman-style statutory analysis.230
Missouri’s current prostitution statute provides somewhat circular text: “A 
person commits the crime of prostitution if the person performs an act of prosti-
tution.”231 A person commits prostitution when “he engages or offers or agrees
to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for something of val-
ue to be received by the person or by a third person.”232 In turn, “sexual con-
duct” is further defined under Missouri’s statute.233 Part (a) requires only vagi-
nal penetration, “however slight,” while part (b) applies to any “deviate” 
intercourse, which applies to any other form of copulation.234 Meanwhile under
part (c), the Missouri legislature decided to sweep up anything else, including 
“any touching, manual or otherwise, of the anus or genitals of one person by 
228  See Walters, supra note 11. 
229  Porn Nearby, supra note 209. 
230  MO. REV. STAT. § 567.010 (effective Jan. 1, 2017). 
231  MO. REV. STAT. § 567.020 (2015). 
232  Id. § 567.010(2). 
233  Id. § 567.010(4). 
234  Id. § 567.010(4)(a), (b). 
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another, done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of either 
party.”235 This language seems to be a Freeman-style statutory construction,
but it offers little comfort to adult film producers if it merely exempts touching, 
and not intercourse of any kind. 
Under the statutory text come January 1, 2017, even simulated sex on cam-
era might be illegal. On that date, a new version of the statute will come into 
effect, which sweeps everything up into one very expansive definition. Under 
the new version, “[a] person commits the offense of prostitution if he or she 
engages in or offers or agrees to engage in sexual conduct with another person 
in return for something of value to be received by any person.”236
2. Porn Up Against Wahl
To remove most doubt from the picture, there is a Missouri Appellate 
Court decision that is mostly on-point—and it seems to prohibit porn produc-
tion in Missouri, at least with the same strength of authority that Taylor permits 
it in Arizona. 
In 2002, Missouri’s Appellate Court had occasion to deal with both a live 
sex show and, tangentially, acting for pornographic film purposes.237 The out-
come was contrary to Freeman, but given the textual difference between the 
Missouri statute in place at the time and the California prostitution statute, the 
decision was not incompatible with the Freeman statutory analysis. Given the 
even tighter language of the 2017 Missouri prostitution statute, it would seem 
that unless this case is overturned, and on a constitutional basis, Missouri is a 
questionable place to shoot porn. 
In the 2002 case, Wahl and his wife posted an ad in a local newspaper ad-
vertising that they would provide an “erotically entertaining and educational 
live show featuring adult performers.”238 Detectives paid the couple $200, and
they provided the undercover officers with “various books, literature and pam-
phlets of a sexual nature.”239 They then, in the parlance of our time, “got down
to business.”240 One of the detectives requested permission to videotape the
performance, and Wahl agreed.241 The detectives then issued a writ of coitus
interruptus and arrested the couple, charging them with misdemeanor prostitu-
tion.242 The jury found Mr. Wahl guilty,243 and he appealed pro se.244
235  Id. § 567.010(4)(c) (emphasis added). 
236  Id. § 567.020. 
237  State v. Wahl, 89 S.W.3d 513, 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
238  Id. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. (“Defendant and co-defendant then placed their mouths on each other’s genitals and 
performed oral sex.”). 
241  Id. 
242  Id. 
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Because Wahl represented himself in the appeal, he appears to have made a 
significant number of procedural errors. It is unclear whether he raised a First 
Amendment argument at trial, but the Court noted that he did raise it, albeit im-
properly, as one of his three arguments on appeal.245 He also argued that his
conduct did not fit the prostitution statute, and that the prosecution violated his 
due process rights and his right to be free from religious discrimination.246
The Appellate Court seemed to have little tolerance for Wahl, and made it 
clear that it was under no obligation to review the defective appeal.247 Never-
theless, the Court stated that it would review the statutory construction portion 
of Wahl’s appeal ex gratia—or out of kindness or grace.248
Having taken Wahl’s arguments as a matter of charity, the Court made 
short work of the statutory construction issue. Under Missouri law, as ex-
plained above, Wahl’s conduct fit the prostitution statute.249 If there was any
doubt, the Missouri Appellate Court made it clear. “The intent and purpose of 
the prostitution statute is to outlaw commercial sexual conduct including but 
not limited to sexual intercourse.”250
But what of the constitutional argument? The Missouri Appellate Court’s 
ex gratia emotions were apparently not strong enough to warrant constitutional 
analysis. Therefore, the Court ruled against Wahl without even considering his 
constitutional arguments.251
Stating that Missouri courts have ruled definitively on the issue is over- 
simplifying things. The Missouri court did have the constitutional issue before 
it, albeit improperly briefed. It presumably was aware of Freeman, and chose to 
avoid engaging in any constitutional analysis at all. What does this suggest? 
Perhaps the Court knew that it would have no choice but to rule in Wahl’s fa-
vor if it addressed his First Amendment arguments, and for that reason they de-
clined, since there was no obligation to do so. Or, perhaps the Missouri Court’s 
silence on the constitutional issue is a result of complete contempt for the ar-
gument. Speculating on it is difficult, but porn producers should consider the 
fact that the weight of the law, however light it is, is against them in Missouri 
unless there is another case giving an opportunity for a properly briefed argu-
ment to the Missouri Court of Appeals. Of course, if there is a shoot in Mis-
243  Id. at 514–15. Ms. Wahl was arrested and was also a co-defendant. Id. at 514. The out-
come of her case is not discussed in the appellate court opinion. 
244  Id. at 514. 
245  Id. at 515–16. 
246  Id. at 516. 
247  Id. 
248  Id. 
249  Id. 
250  Id. 
251  Id. at 516–17. 
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souri, and a prosecutor tries to invoke Wahl, it could set up a full constitutional 
showdown there. 
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE HYPOTHETICAL CONSTITUTIONAL
SHOWDOWN 
Courts that have dealt with the issue of pornography versus prostitution, 
including New Hampshire in Theriault and California in Freeman, based their 
decisions on State Constitutions.252 This has ensured that these cases are not 
open to review by the U.S. Supreme Court.253 In spite of that, we are not with-
out any higher court guidance on the First Amendment issue; our guidance is 
just not binding authority. 
Before Freeman, there was at least one reported case rejecting Freeman’s 
future analysis, although the case provided little analysis of its own. In United 
States v. Roeder, the defendant was prosecuted under the Mann Act.254 The
Mann Act prohibits the interstate transportation of any individual in order to 
have that person engage in prostitution.255 In Roeder, a producer of adult films
was convicted when he was prosecuted for driving a woman from Missouri to 
Kansas to be in a porn film.256 Since Roeder hired her to engage in sexual con-
duct, and she was driven across state lines for that purpose, it met the definition 
of “prostitution.”257 The Tenth Circuit then upheld the conviction.258
Unlike many other cases, Roeder himself was going to be in the movie 
along with the woman.259 Therefore, “he fulfilled not only the broad Supreme
Court definition of prostitution, but the more basic and narrower understanding 
of prostitution by being the ‘customer’ who paid a woman to have sex with 
him.”260 This case not only steps outside of Freeman’s analysis, but it also pre-
dates it. This seems to suggest that its holding is either no longer good law, or 
is limited to its facts. The Tenth Circuit side-stepped the First Amendment 
analysis, making it clear that Congress could prohibit “the interstate transporta-
tion of a woman for the purpose of prostitution” and that the Mann Act “is not a 
suppression of speech or expression.”261 Nevertheless, the opinion does not
252  California v. Freeman, 488 U.S. 1311, 1315 (1989); State v. Theriault, 960 A.2d 687, 693 
(N.H. 2008). 
253  Note that if Theriault and Freeman had come out against pornography, they would likely 
have had to perform a federal constitutional analysis appealable to the Supreme Court. 
254  18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2012); United States v. Roeder, 526 F.2d 736, 737 (10th Cir. 1975) 
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976). 
255  Roeder, 526 F.2d at 739. 
256  Id. at 737. 
257  Id. 
258  Id. at 739. 
259  Id. at 737. 
260  Tonya R. Noldon, Note, Challenging First Amendment Protection of Adult Films with the 
Use of Prostitution Statutes, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 310, 315 (2004). 
261  Roeder, 526 F.2d at 739. 
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consider that if Mr. Roeder were not acting in the film, things might have been 
very different—one way or the other. 
Aside from Roeder and Freeman’s denial of stay, there has been one other 
higher court opinion that has hinted at the First Amendment application to adult 
entertainment, even in the case of live shows. In a 2001 Seventh Circuit case, 
the Court upheld a city zoning ordinance denying the plaintiff’s burlesque club 
near residential neighborhoods.262 Writing for the panel, Judge Posner opined
that “there is no reasonable doubt that a burlesque theater that exhibits nude 
dancing is similar to an adult movie theater. Both are theaters, both present 
erotic entertainment, and if anything a live sex show is more erotic than a cellu-
loid one.”263 The Court hinted at problems where authorities deny expressive
activity, including erotic dancing, but did not have to perform a First Amend-
ment analysis since the case was constricted to zoning and not an outright 
ban.264
Before officials make any hasty decisions to move forward with prosecu-
tion of adult film producers, they should be wary of the effects of both a Free-
man type decision and an appeal to a higher court requiring First Amendment 
analysis. When California appealed Freeman to the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Court declined to accept certiorari due to Justice O’Connor’s analysis that the 
independent and unreviewable state ground for the decision meant that a Su-
preme Court decision would be merely advisory in nature.265 Thus, the possibil-
ity that the Supreme Court could consider whether prostitution laws could be 
used to prohibit professional porn production remains open. Such a finding 
would be out of alignment with the prevailing trend in the law. Further, while 
Roeder seems to have rejected Freeman’s not yet existing analysis, it did so in 
few words, and did so under facts that would have constituted “prostitution” 
even under Freeman, in that the producer of the movie was not only the pro-
ducer, but also going to be sexual partners with the woman transported across 
state lines.266
 Freeman’s First Amendment analysis seems sound, with no decisions call-
ing it into question—anywhere—since it was entered. The First Amendment 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”267 “[A]s a general matter, ‘the First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.’ ”268 The Supreme Court has ruled time and again
that the professional production and distribution of pornography is First 
262  Blue Canary Corp. v. Milwaukee, 270 F.3d 1156, 1157 (7th Cir. 2001). 
263  Id. at 1158. 
264  Id. at 1157. 
265  California v. Freeman, 488 U.S. 1311, 1315 (1989). 
266  Roeder, 526 F.2d at 737. 
267  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
268  Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (citation omitted). 
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Amendment protected, as long as the materials are not legally obscene.269 As
such, any application of a prostitution law to prohibit the creation of a bona fide 
pornographic film would be “ ‘presumptively invalid’ . . . and the Government 
bears the burden to rebut that presumption.”270 Occasionally, the Court engages
in balancing of the value in unprotected speech, but it does so categorically and 
not on the basis of particular content.271 Restrictions on a few historic catego-
ries of speech have passed constitutional scrutiny—obscenity, defamation, 
fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct—categories that 
“have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”272
Since the Court has categorically protected commercial pornography, time 
and again,273 it is not likely about to change direction to create a new category
of unprotected speech of commercially produced pornography. In fact, the pro-
tection of commercial pornography is so constitutionally ingrained, that Con-
gress saw fit to actually regulate the industry. In 1988, Congress enacted the 
Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act.274 Section 7513(a) of the
Act, known by its codified section number as § 2257 requires recording and re-
porting of certain age information about the professional adult film actors. 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2257, producers of films depicting “sexually explicit 
conduct” must maintain age and identity records for their actors. Section 2257 
defines “sexually explicit conduct” as “sexual intercourse, including genital-
genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the 
same or opposite sex.”275 Under the law, a producer must examine, and retain a
copy of, each model’s or performer’s photo identification.276 It must also make
these records available for government inspection.277 Further, the regulations
require a statement that discloses where the records are, and the name of any 
269  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also, Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. In-
diana, 489 U.S. 46, 79 (1989) (noting the existence of a “line between protected pornograph-
ic speech and obscenity.”). 
270  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)). 
271  See generally, John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of 
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); 
Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Sub-
ject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978). 
272  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 460 (2010) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
273  See, e.g., Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 564; Miller, 413 U.S. at 22 n.3; Redrup v. New York, 386 
U.S. 767 (1967); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 53 (1965); A Quantity of Copies of 
Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 214 (1964); Manual Enters., v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 479 
(1962). 
274  See Am. Library Ass’n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
275  18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A) (2012). 
276  See id. §§ 2257(a)(1), 2257(b); 28 C.F.R. § 75.2 (2015). 
277  See 18 U.S.C. § 2257(c); 28 C.F.R. §§ 75.4–75.5. 
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custodian.278 This complex regulatory regime seems awfully in-depth and com-
plicated if the mere act of commercial production of pornography was already 
illegal. It is akin to creating a complex set of regulations for the illegal distribu-
tion of MDMA in nightclubs. This seems to be at least a tacit admission that 
Roeder is not likely to be repeated in the true commercial pornography context. 
Freeman is the only case to address the First Amendment implications of 
applying prostitution laws to commercial production of pornography. However, 
it seems that the lack of jurisprudence on that particular issue since then has 
been the result of a recognition even by anti-porn forces that such an impedi-
ment to the production of pornography is dead on arrival. 
CONCLUSION 
  It is true that only two states have definitively answered the precise ques-
tion of “is porn production prostitution?” But, a state need not address that pre-
cise question for it to be a settled question. The question really comes down to 
two questions. First, we ask whether the statute prohibits merely “sexual grati-
fication” or whether it prohibits all “sexual contact.” If the former, then an 
analysis under Freeman and Theriault tells us that porn production does not 
even implicate the statute. If the statute prohibits “sexual contact” or is even 
broader in scope, then we must ask whether the state and Federal Constitution 
would tolerate prosecution on this basis. Thus far, it seems unthinkable that 
such a prosecution would pass muster under either the Federal Constitution or 
any state counterparts. 
 In the event that another state wishes to tackle this issue, it would likely be 
a fool’s errand. Only a fanatical anti-porn crusader would bring such a prosecu-
tion at this point. And if such a prosecutor brought such a case, the most likely 
outcome would be a state court decision following Freeman or a landmark de-
cision based on the Federal Constitution. 
Ironically the reasoning that gives life to the myth that filming pornogra-
phy is legal only in California and New Hampshire is the same mythological 
spirit preventing many states from confronting Freeman. 
No prosecutor wants to be responsible for bringing the landmark case resulting 
in their state becoming the latest safe-haven for adult content production. A state 
attorney who lets that happen on his (or her) watch can kiss any political or judi-
cial aspirations “goodbye.” Therefore, a quiet detent has existed in the other for-
ty-eight states (including Florida), where the applicability of prostitution laws to 
adult content production remains unsettled, with law enforcement generally 
looking the other way when it comes to such issues.279
 Even if a state court were able to hypothetically put an end to Freeman’s 
shadow once and for all, would it be worth it? What are the stakes? If success-
278  See 18 U.S.C. § 2257(e); 28 C.F.R. § 75.6. 
279  Walters, supra note 11. 
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ful, would it really put an end to porn production, or would it just go under-
ground? It may be true that the number of filed permits for adult film studios 
dropped dramatically in Los Angeles since the institution of the “condom law,” 
but still, this doesn’t mean that porn is not being produced within the city lim-
its. Though many producers have moved to different cities and counties within 
California, and others to neighboring states, some have chosen to ignore the or-
dinance all together.280
In light of “real” crime, should law enforcement really look at porn film 
production as a priority? A successful prosecution seems constitutionally un-
likely, and a single prosecution would likely have no definitive, actual effect 
upon production in that state. Meanwhile, any state with a definitive Freeman-
like ruling would be added to the list of states where there is an absolute, de-
finitive decision rendering the entire state a zone for protected porn production. 
At the end of the day, commercial pornography is not prostitution in most 
states. Even in the states where it could be, the First Amendment or the State 
Constitution’s freedom of expression clause will step in and block any effort to 
prosecute it as such—no matter how hard politicians, anti-porn zealots, or a 
misinformed media may cling to the urban legend that porn can only be shot in 
California and New Hampshire. 
280  See Susan Abram, Condom Bill Dies in Key California Committee, Porn Industry Satis-
fied—for Now, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014, 8:07 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/gov 
ernment-and-politics/20140814/condom-bill-dies-in-key-california-committee-porn-industry 
-satisfied-x2014-for-now [https://perma.cc/72US-ZFCG]; Editorial, Condoms for Porn Ac-
tors: A Statewide Law Isn’t the Answer, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-condoms-porn-20140810-story.html
[https://perma.cc/Z7A7-2LAW]; John Rogers, LA Porn Producers Go Underground After
Condom Law, BAKERSFIELD NOW (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.bakersfield now.com/
news/local/LA-porn-producers-go-underground-after-condom-law-11-17-2015 [htt ps://perm
a.cc/DGL5-GRN3]; US Court Upholds Los Angeles Condom Law for Porn Actors, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30489942 [https:// perm
a.cc/MX27-6DDN].
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